The Economics of Monasticism
Nathan Smith
Department of Economics,
George Mason University
Since their emergence in ancient times, Christian monasteries have proven
to be among the most durable of all human institutions, and in the medieval centuries
made enormous contributions to the emergence of Western civilization. They are
organized internally on socialist lines: monks own no property and owe total obedience to
the abbot, making the monastery a miniature ‘centrally planned economy.’ A puzzling
contrast exists between the longevity of monasteries and the transience of secular
socialist communes. This paper presents a theoretical model which shows why voluntary
socialist communes might be viable despite ‘shirking’ problems, yet fail due to turnover,
and how worship, which induces people with high ‘spiritual capital’ to self-select into the
monastery and then grows that spiritual capital through ‘learning-by-doing,’ can solve the
turnover problem and make a worship-based socialist commune—a monastery—stable.
Monasticism, like the market, is a form of ‘spontaneous order,’ but unlike the market, it
does not depend on third-party enforcement (e.g., by a state) to function: this explains
why monasticism (unlike capitalism) was able to thrive in the anarchic Dark Ages.
Monasteries, in principle and largely in practice, are a form of society based on consent
of the governed, unlike liberal states which preach but do not practice consensual
governance, and it is interesting to juxtapose the real, live ‘social contracts’ of the
monasteries with the notional social contracts of liberal political theory.
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