Religious Freedom and Conflict:
A Review of the Evidence

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Introduction
When an unlikely alliance of American religious groups and human rights activists advocated for improving the state of international religious freedom in the mid-1990s, they described religious freedom as the overlooked “orphan of human rights” (Hertzke 2004, p. 69). But if religious freedoms were frequently overlooked in the policy arena in the 1990s, they were often completely ignored in the study of social conflict. Prior to 2000 there were virtually no systematic data collections on religious freedoms and few studies attempted to understand the relationship between religious freedoms and social conflict. Indeed, even the more general topic of religion was surprisingly ignored in most studies of social conflict. Samuel P. Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" is the most notable exception, but this approach gained little support from other social scientists and his silence on religious freedoms spoke volumes for many (Huntington 1996).

Since 2000, however, there has been a flurry of data collections on religious freedoms and a new body of research has begun to emerge. This report reviews some of the most significant findings from this new research. We begin by offering global overviews of religious freedoms, promises of freedoms and social conflict. We find that despite assurances in most national constitutions, these promises of religious freedom are routinely denied. Next, we strive to better understand the sources of religious freedoms and restrictions. Relying heavily on the new data sources, we review the social and cultural pressures and the government structures and administrative units that are often associated with reduced freedoms. Finally, we turn to the relationship between religious freedoms and social conflict. Although religious freedoms are often denied in a stated effort to preserve peace and curb religious violence, the data suggest that doing so has the opposite effect (Toft, Philpott and Shah 2011). Denying religious freedoms results in higher levels of violence both against religions and by religious groups.

After completing this global overview, we devote the second half of our report to a series of national case studies. Each of the studies allows us to touch on many of the topics reviewed in the global profiles. They also offer specific examples of the topics reviewed and allow us to unveil the processes and actions involved in the relationships religious freedoms hold with social conflict. The case studies help illustrate the complex relationships that religion can hold with the state and help identify how religious restrictions serve to heighten religious differences, intensify and multiply grievances, and combine with economic, social and cultural forces to fuel and exacerbate social conflict.

Before we review the details of each case or offer an overview of global trends, however, we begin with a few clarifications on both definitions and data. Although the terms "religion," "religious groups" and "religious freedoms" are familiar to all and have seemingly obvious definitions, heated legal and legislative debates often center on how each is defined. Thus, our first task is to clearly distinguish religion and religious groups from other associated ideologies and organizations.

For this report we define religion as explanations of existence based on supernatural assumptions that include statements about the nature and workings of the supernatural and about ultimate meaning. Whereas some define religion based on the functions it performs for individuals or for society at large, our definition confines religion to beliefs and practices that are based on supernatural assumptions. This helps to distinguish religion from secular ideologies, science and other forms of culture that may serve many of the same functions of belonging and belief that religion performs. By
extension, we define religious groups as collectives that promote religious beliefs, symbols and practices that support these supernatural assumptions.

Building on these two definitions, religious freedom refers to the unrestricted practice, profession and selection of religion. Restrictions on these freedoms can be targeted at both individuals and groups, and they can come from multiple sources. The most obvious source of restrictions on religious freedoms is the state, which may restrict these freedoms through its laws, policies or administrative actions. The state's restrictions might target select religions or all religions operating within the country. But religious freedoms may also be denied by groups and individuals operating without official state sanction. Social movements, competing religious groups and the culture at large all have the capacity to curb the practice, profession and selection of religion. As a result, the religious freedoms of individuals, as well as the freedoms of the group, can be denied by the formal actions of the state or by the actions of social groups and individuals not formally sanctioned by the state.

Finally, as noted above, the paucity of data on religious freedom prior to 2000 gave way to multiple data options in the years following 2000. The most significant data collections were conducted by Freedom House (Marshall 2000), the Religion and State Project at Bar Ilan University (Fox 2008), the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life (2009) and the Association of Religion Data Archives (www.theARDA.com) at Penn State University (Grim and Finke 2006). Although the collections vary in the research methodologies and information sources used, their religious freedom measures are highly correlated and have produced very similar results. Most of the tables for this report will rely on the Association of Religion Data Archives’ collection. This data collection offers the full range of measures needed for this report and is publically available for review and download on theARDA.com. We will also restrict our coverage to the approximately 140 nations with a population of two million or more in the years we examine. This includes the vast majority of the world's population and allows for more meaningful comparisons across countries. The appendices offer more details regarding the ARDA's data collection and the measures used in relevant indexes.

Religious Freedoms in the Global Context
Despite being labeled the orphan of human rights in the 1990s, religious freedom was one of the first rights to be recognized under international law.\(^1\) Even today a review of formal international and national documents on religion suggests that governments and the international community recognize the position of religious freedoms in the constellation of human rights. Article 18 of the United Nations’ 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)\(^2\) offers the following assurances:

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

In addition, Article 2 of the UDHR promises that none of the human rights described in the Declaration can be denied due to a person’s religion. Altogether, the UDHR offered a strong statement of support for religious freedom.

\(^1\) The Peace of Augsburg (1555) and the Peace of Westphalia (1648) offer the earliest basic protections for religious freedom, though both accords focused on rulers and gave little attention to individuals’ rights.

The UN’s 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) sought to more fully specify the human rights outlined in the UDHR and to establish legal obligations for participating nations to uphold these rights. Although some debate whether or not the Covenant brought greater clarity to the area of religious freedoms, the treaty went into effect in 1976, has been ratified or acceded to by 167 nations and resulted in the appointment of a Human Rights Committee for monitoring such freedoms. Whereas Article 18 was a component of a non-binding UN declaration, the ICCPR is a treaty that is binding on its signatories under international law.

The UN offered still more support for religious freedoms in 1981 when the General Assembly passed the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. Dedicated to issues regarding religious freedom, this resolution provided two additional supports to extant international law. First, the eight articles of the Declaration provided far more detail on the international norms and expectations for religious freedoms. Second, the Declaration led to the appointment of a Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief in 1986. Using the Declaration as the standard, the Special Rapporteur is charged with examining violations of religious freedom, transmitting appeals to states guilty of such violations, conducting fact-finding visits and submitting annual reports. Like the more general Human Rights Committee reports, this has resulted in an expansive public dialogue and is yet another attempt to monitor religious freedoms.

Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has also served as a model for many nations’ constitutional guarantees of religious freedom as well as a model for other international organizations’ official position on the issue. The opening sentence of the European Convention on Human Rights’ Article 9, for example, is copied directly from the Declaration. This modeling goes far beyond Europe. Some countries, such as Cameroon and Ethiopia, incorporate Article 18 of the UDHR into their constitutions word for word. Others incorporate most of Article 18 or qualify its provisions with addenda. The constitutions of Guyana and Sierra Leone, for example, combine nearly verbatim restatements of Article 18 with prefaces that the stated freedoms may not be denied “except with [one’s] own consent.” Article 9 of the constitution of Belarus copies most of Article 18 of the UDHR, but it adds that only manifestations of religion or belief that are not prohibited by law are allowed by the state.

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3 For the current list of countries that have ratified or acceded to the ICCPR, see the United Nations Treaty Collection at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en&clang_en].

4 The full text of the UN resolution can be found in Taylor (2005: 368-372) or at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/religion.htm.


6 For the constitution of Cameroon, see the Centre for Human Rights at the University of Pretoria (http://www.chr.up.ac.za/index.php/documents-by-country-database/cameroon.html), and see the International Constitutional Law Database for the constitution of Ethiopia (http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/et_index.html).

7 For the constitution of Guyana, see the Guyana Information Agency (http://www.gina.gov.gy/gina_pub/laws/Laws/cap101.pdf) and for the constitution of Sierra Leone, see the Religion and Law Consortium (http://www.religlaw.org/country_portal.php?page_id=22&countryID=171).

A review of national constitutions demonstrates that assurances of religious freedom are common. Indeed, it is the lack of such assurances that is rare. As shown in Figure 1, 92 percent of the 141 countries with populations greater than two million have constitutions that provide for religious freedom as of 2008. Only 11 countries fail to provide such assurances. Despite the many formal statements promising religious freedoms, the chasm between these promises and actual respect for religious freedoms is wide. Indeed, a closer inspection reveals that many constitutions provide assurances of religious freedom in one statement, but contain provisions that allow for the denial of freedoms in other sections of the same constitution. The new constitution of Afghanistan offers one such example. Article 2 promises that members of non-Islamic "religions are free to exercise their faith and perform their religious rites within the limits of the provisions of law," and Article 3 explains that "no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion of Islam." As currently interpreted in Afghanistan, this virtually eliminates the public profession of faiths other than Islam and denies the freedom to convert to a religion other than Islam. Even stable democracies that may otherwise strongly support their citizens’ civil liberties offer some constitutional openings for restricting select religions, minority faiths in particular. Although the European Convention on Human Rights' Article 9 begins by copying Article 18 of the UN's 1948 Universal Declaration, the second statement in Article 9 has been used to compromise the first:

> Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

For the state and the cultural majority, minority religions are often perceived to threaten the "public order" or even the "health and morals," as mentioned above, of the population. One of many examples occurred in 1995, when the 1995 National Assembly of France appointed the Gest Commission to report on the dangers of cults for individuals and society. The Commission conceded that it could not define or measure a cult, yet it identified 173 dangerous sects and cults operating in France. The supposed dangers associated with these cults were also vague as described in the Commission’s report, and included "psychological dependence," "deception" and "ill-treatment," though few specific examples were cited. Numerous other examples could be used to illustrate how statements presented as securing religious freedoms often allow openings for denying those same freedoms.

10 To review the full report see Gest and Guyard (1995); Germany and Belgium produced a similar list of dangerous cults and sects.
A long list of advocacy groups report on freedoms denied, but the most convincing evidence has been produced by sources with no ties to the groups being restricted. Reports by the UN’s Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion are filled with examples from across the globe. At the close of her 2007 report, Asma Jahangir wrote that the implementation of the 1981 Declaration “is far from being a reality” and “there still is a huge gap between rhetoric and practice in many instances.”\textsuperscript{11} She went on to express concern over the number of “urgent appeals” and “allegation letters” on the denial of religious freedoms that receive no response. In her 2006 report she complained that the number of countries that refuse to offer her an invitation to visit had been increasing.\textsuperscript{12} In 2009 she concluded that “discrimination based on religion or belief preventing individuals from fully enjoying all their human rights still occurs worldwide on a daily basis.”\textsuperscript{13}

The long list of charges made by the UN’s Special Rapporteur is clearly confirmed by recent data collections. The multiple measures of religious freedom assembled since 2000 all document that religious liberties are violated frequently. Figure 2 shows that laws denying religious freedoms are widespread even among countries that guarantee religious freedom in their constitutions. Of the 126 countries with constitutional clauses assuring religious freedom, 55 percent (69 countries) have laws that interfere with the free exercise of religion. Most of these countries (53 of the 69) have laws on the books that regulate some religions and not others, and despite their constitutional guarantees of freedom of worship, six of these countries have legal systems that prohibit the free exercise of religion. Of the 11 countries not promising religious freedom (not shown in Figure 2), all have legal systems that obstruct religious free exercise for at least some religious groups. A recent study conducted by Jonathan Fox on constitutional clauses and religious legislation replicates these findings. He concludes that constitutional clauses are associated with a reduced level of religious legislation, but “nearly all states” have religious legislation (Fox 2011).

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure2.png}
\caption{Does the Law Regulate Religion in Countries With Constitutional Guarantees of Religious Freedom?}
\end{figure}

\begin{itemize}
  \item No (45\%)
  \item Yes (55\%)
\end{itemize}


\textsuperscript{11} Jahangir (2007), p.16.
\textsuperscript{12} Jahangir (2006), p.9. She also noted that Egypt, Eritrea, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan failed to offer a requested invitation in 2006. The 2007 report included Cuba, Ethiopia, India, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Mauritania, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Yemen as not responding to her requests for an invitation.
\textsuperscript{13} Jahangir (2009), p.20.
A closer look at recent data collections reveal that the widespread restrictions on religion strike at the core freedoms outlined in the much-duplicated Article 18. Figure 3 reviews one of the most basic freedoms granted in the Declaration, the freedom to worship. As shown, 42 percent of governments interfere with an individual's right to worship and 18 percent impose severe interference on this right. In assembling a summary index on religious freedoms in 2009, the Pew Research Center's Forum on Religion and Public Life reports that about one-third of all countries “have high or very high restrictions on religion,” a finding that replicates data collected by the ARDA in 2008. The Forum's report goes on to explain that because several of the world’s most populous nations restrict religion in a comprehensive fashion, "nearly 70 percent of the world's 6.8 billion people live in countries with high restrictions on religion” (The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life 2009).

Finally, while there are very clear patterns in the global variation of religious freedoms, no global region or world religion is exempt from denying religious freedoms. Figure 4 on the following page shows regional variation in interference with religious worship in 2008. Clearly some regions restrict religion to greater degrees than others, with majorities of countries limiting freedom of worship in East Asia and the Pacific, the Near East and North Africa, and South and Central Asia. But no region is exempt from restricting religious worship. Even 14 percent of the countries in the Western Hemisphere place restrictions on an individual's freedom to worship. Recall that Figure 4 only shows restrictions on worship. When additional religious restrictions are included, the number of nations that effectively protects religious freedoms continues to decline, though the regional pattern remains unchanged.

Figure 5 (see page 8) offers a global overview of religious freedom by the religious majority in the nation. As many might expect, denial of religious freedoms is more widespread in Muslim-majority countries than in Christian-majority countries or countries with no religious majority, but the very highest levels of restrictions are found in countries with a different type of majority religion. This group includes Buddhist (7), Hindu (2), and Jewish-majority (1) countries, as well as a nation whose populations is majority atheist (1).

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14 Government interference with an individual’s right to worship was judged to be severe when it entailed grave and comprehensive restrictions on religious practice and profession as well as comprehensive government involvement in the affairs of religious organizations.
This quick overview of the denial of religious freedoms (Figures 2 to 5) has focused on two clear types of restrictions: laws regulating religion and interference with religious worship. Yet many forms of restrictions are far less obvious but are equally restrictive. As noted in the French example described earlier, there are often no measures or definitions of the cults and sects that are viewed as dangerous, which allow local religious bureaus and administrators broad discretionary powers to identify groups that allegedly pose a threat to public order. These government agencies and officials are often more responsive to local social pressures and less concerned with the assurance of religious freedoms. The seemingly benign request of asking religious groups to register can also be used to restrict freedoms. In some countries religious registration is little more than a formality, but in others the registration requirement is used to deny entry to many or even most religious groups. Hence, the avenues for denying religious freedoms go far beyond the two examples offered in this review. The denial of religious freedoms across the globe raises two important questions for this report. First, why do so many restrictions occur in so many nations? And second, how are these restrictions on religion related to social conflict? Before addressing these questions, however, we offer a very brief profile of social conflict across the globe.

**Social Conflict in Global Context**

Whereas the denial of religious freedoms often goes unnoticed, entire research journals are devoted to the topic of social conflict, and news and issues surrounding conflicts are frequently featured in the
headlines of the popular press. Because it has been studied and reviewed in such detail, we will devote less space to offering an overview. We do, however, want to briefly review its global patterns, and want to begin to explore the relationship these conflicts hold to religion. We limit our review to a discussion of violent social conflict.

Social conflict is often defined in terms of measures of deaths from armed conflict between the state and another party. One of the most well-known data sources on social conflict is the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (herein referred to as the Uppsala Dataset) developed by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University and Centre for the Study of Civil War at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). The Uppsala Dataset defines armed conflicts as conflicts where armed force is used between two parties, at least one of whom is the government of a state. This dataset offers a lower threshold for inclusion than do the earlier Correlates of War data collections: 25 annual battle-deaths is the threshold for inclusion rather than the 1,000 used by Correlates of War.\(^\text{15}\) Although the measure identifies four discrete types of conflicts, we only employ the UCDP/PRIO measure of internal armed conflict, which restricts the conflict population to those that do not feature intervention from

\(^{15}\) Gleditsch et al. (2002) offer a detailed description of the dataset and multiple updates on the data collection have been published in the *Journal of Peace Research*. For additional information on the dataset or to download the data, go to (http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/) or to the MacroDataGuide at (http://www.nsd.uib.no/macrodataguide/set.html?id=55&sub=1)
other states. However, because this measure is limited to conflict that occurs between the state and other parties, it does not identify social conflicts that take place between members of identity groups without direct government support. Conflicts between ethnic or religious groups in which the government is not actively involved in fighting on behalf of one of the groups are not captured in the Uppsala Dataset (UCDP/PRIO 2009).

To include the conflicts that do not involve state governments, such as internal civil and ethnic conflicts, we computed a measure of social conflict from two distinct datasets. We refer to this measure as the country’s Intrastate Social Conflict (ISC) score. A country’s ISC score identifies whether or not the country was the site of an episode of violent social conflict within its borders during the years 2004 and 2005. We computed this measure by identifying whether a country experienced an intrastate social conflict as captured by either the Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) dataset or by the Minorities at Risk project dataset (MAR).

The Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1946-2008 dataset (MEPV) identifies countries that have been sites of political conflicts over a 62-year period. The MEPV dataset defines major episodes of political violence as the sustained, systematic use of lethal force by organized groups leading directly to the deaths of at least 500 people over the entire duration of the episode. These episodes include civil and ethnic conflicts that take place within a single country, with “civil” and “ethnic” conflicts defined as those fought along identity group-based and/or political lines (Marshall 2010). When the MEPV dataset identified that a country was the site of a civil or ethnic conflict in either 2004 or 2005, we assigned it a preliminary score of 1.

The major deficiency of the MEPV dataset for our purposes is that, as with the Uppsala Dataset, a government has to be a party to a conflict for the conflict to be noted in the MEPV. Even major episodes of ethnic violence recorded in the MEPV dataset include state representatives in the fighting. In order to expand on the MEPV dataset’s measure of social conflict so as to include conflicts that the government is not a party to, we combine it with another measure of conflict derived from the Minorities at Risk project dataset.

The Minorities at Risk (MAR) Project monitors and records the status of communal groups around the world. The Minorities at Risk Project’s (2009) dataset includes information on conflicts within religious or ethnic groups in a country, conflicts between groups and conflicts between groups and the state. We assigned a preliminary score of 1 to a country, indicating that it was the site of a conflict involving an ethnic or religious identity group based on the MAR dataset, if it met any of the following criteria in 2004 or 2005: (1) intracommunal conflict, or conflict within an ethnic or religious identity group, was present in the country, and the conflict was severe enough to feature at least a series of bombings or assassinations; (2) intercommunal conflict, or conflict between identity

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16 See Appendix C for more information on the four types of conflicts that the Uppsala Dataset distinguishes between.
17 We include conflicts in both years in our measure because the measures of government restriction, social restriction and others from the ARDA data collection were recorded in the period from July 2004 to June 2005.
18 Conflicts fit into one of seven categories: civil wars or violence, ethnic wars or violence, international wars or violence, or international wars of independence. The distinction between “violence” and a “war” is based on consideration of a few factors, including the combatants’ level of organization, the clarity of their objectives and the conflict’s degree of institutionalization.
19 See Appendix C for detailed information about how we transformed a variable from the MEPV dataset to determine whether the dataset indicated that a conflict had taken place in 2004 or 2005.
groups, was present in the country, and the conflict was severe enough to feature communal rioting and armed attacks; or (3) rebellion against the government was reported that included at least some small-scale guerrilla activity.\textsuperscript{20}

We computed a country’s ISC score by combining the measures of social conflict from the MEPV and MAR datasets. A country was given a score of 1 on the ISC measure if it was coded as being the site of a social conflict in either the MEPV or MAR datasets as described above; in other words, if it received a preliminary score of one on our coding of the MEPV or MAR conflict variables we examined. A score of 0 on the ISC measure indicates the absence of intrastate social conflict according to both the MEPV and MAR datasets.

Yet another measure of social conflict was developed by researchers at the Association of Religion Data Archives and is based on their coding of the U.S. Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Reports. This item measures the extent to which violence in the country is related to religion, including violence where the religious are either the victims or the perpetrators.\textsuperscript{21} This measure is more inclusive than the prior two measures of social conflict because it includes all acts of physical violence and does not rely on battle-deaths. But it is more exclusive because it only measures violence related to religion. Throughout this report we will contrast countries where religion-related violence is widespread with those countries where it is either isolated or where no such violence is reported.

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\textsuperscript{20} See Appendix C for detailed information on how we recoded MAR variables to determine whether a social conflict had taken place in 2004 or 2005 according to the MAR dataset.

\textsuperscript{21} For analytic purposes we recoded this measure into two categories: one indicating that only isolated acts of religion-related violence were reported (if any were reported at all), and another indicating that widespread acts of religion-related violence were reported.
Regardless of the social conflict measure used, an examination of global social conflict reveals a similar regional pattern. Figure 6 above offers a broad overview of the regions where conflicts occurred. The overall pattern of global violence is a familiar one and shows similarities to Figure 4’s overview of government interference with religious worship (see page 7). Intrastate armed conflicts in 2004-2005 that involve the state itself, as captured by the Uppsala dataset, are by far the most widespread in South and Central Asia, where 5 of the 11 countries with a population of at least two million (46% of such countries) were the sites of these types of conflicts. Indeed, all three measures of social conflict identify this region as the world’s most conflict-ridden in 2004-2005, in terms of the percentages of countries in regions that hosted social conflicts. The ISC measure, however, paints a more diffuse picture of social conflict in the world. Because the ISC includes internal civil and ethnic conflicts as well as conflicts involving state governments, it finds social conflict in far more nations. This increase is especially pronounced in Africa, doubling from 23 to 46 percent of the countries in the region, and in the Near East and North Africa, where the percentage of countries jumps from 19 to 50. In each of these regions, the internal conflicts between ethnic and religious identity groups, without direct government support, are more finely captured by the ISC measure.

Our final measure taps into religion-related violence and offers an initial glimpse into the relationship religion holds with social conflict. In some regions incidence of this phenomenon is lower than for the other two conflict measures because much of the violence captured in these measures is not related to religion. For example, we observe that countries in Africa, not including those that border the Mediterranean, were less likely to be the sites of religion-related violence (only 17% were) than they were to be the sites of internal conflict as captured by the other two conflict measures (23% of countries according to the Uppsala dataset and 46% according to the ISC). Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire and Ethiopia are among the countries that experienced social conflict in 2004-2005 but were not sites of religion-related violence as per the State Department’s International Religious Freedom reports from mid-2004 to mid-2005. A similar pattern existed in the Western Hemisphere, where countries were less likely to have been the sites of religion-related violence than they were to be sites of broader social conflicts. In other regions, the measure is greater because much of the violence is related to religion and the measure uses a more inclusive definition of social conflict. South and Central Asia stands out in particular, as eight of the eleven countries in the region (73%) are sites of widespread religion-related violence. Although not reviewed here, other work has shown that much of this violence arises because the state and majority religions commit acts of violence against minority religions (Grim and Finke 2011). This is a pattern that is common as we explore restrictions on religious freedoms in the next section.

Sources of Religious Freedoms and Restrictions
Understanding why religious freedoms are denied and how such restrictions might be related to social conflict requires that we first explore the motivations, institutions and movements involved in the denial of religious freedoms. In particular, we want to understand how both the motivations and mechanisms for restricting religious freedoms differ from the motivations and mechanisms for denying other human rights.

At first glance, religious liberties appear to have much in common with other human rights. At their core, religious freedoms can be viewed as extensions of other human rights or even redundancies. For example, when we look at the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), we find that Article 18 on religious freedom clearly overlaps with the two articles that follow it. The freedom to hold, to teach, and to change religious beliefs in public or private might be viewed as a more specific example of the freedom of opinion and expression (Article 19). Likewise, the freedom to worship and observe religion publicly overlaps with the freedom
of peaceful assembly and association (Article 20). Religion is also listed as a distinctive status category in most covenants and formal statements on human rights, as the UDHR includes religion on the list of status categories that are assured all human rights, a list that includes race, color, sex, language, social origin and property. Yet despite the similarities between religious freedoms and other liberties, and despite being on the list of status categories assured of human rights, religion differs from other human rights in several key ways, particularly with regard to its distinctive relationships with the state and with culture as a whole.

Unlike most other status categories mentioned in the UDHR, religion is organized into distinctive institutions and holds a myriad of relationships with the state and larger culture. Along with providing religious beliefs, symbols and practices to the local community, religious institutions may also serve as a source of interpersonal unity at the regional and national levels. Indeed, one of the fears some governing bodies have is that religious institutions can provide an organizational form to underlying political and cultural pressures. Understanding the varied relationships between religion and state is an important starting point for understanding both religious freedoms and the potential for conflict.

One of the most common patterns of religion-state interaction is that the state forms an alliance with the dominant religion or group of religions. For the state, such an alliance may confer political stability, visible support from the dominant religion and culture, and often a mechanism for controlling the activities of the most powerful religious institutions. For religious institutions, these alliances offer opportunities to procure resources from the state and to restrict the activities of competitors. The most obvious competitors are other religions, but cultural and even state institutions (e.g., secular courts, schools) can be viewed as competitors with the dominant religion. Institutional alliances can imbue religious authority to most institutions in the country, as in Saudi Arabia, or they can be based on past traditions and offer little formal authority, as in many Latin American countries. Even nations that are officially atheist, such as China, form alliances with select religions as they target others for regulation or elimination (Yang 2006; Richardson and Edelman 2004). These alliances typically do increase select religions’ resources and reduce the potential for grievances to develop, but for minority religions such alliances often result in unequal treatment at best and possibly even suppression and persecution.

Even when countries support a secular state that separates the activities of religious and state institutions, the level of religious freedoms granted is highly variable and all religions are vulnerable to the actions of the state. Some states, especially communist nations, maintain a secular ideology that views religious organizations as potential threats that must be heavily regulated or restricted. Mao’s Cultural Revolution (1966-1979) or the former Soviet Union represent extreme outcomes of this position, where the state attempts to eliminate religion (Yang 2006; Froese 2004, 2008). The United States might be viewed as the other extreme. Religious institutions have no direct control over the operation of the state in the US, but the

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22 The complete wording of Article 2 is as follows: “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour [sic], sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.”

23 See Gill (2008) for an extended discussion on this topic.
state must show a "compelling interest" in order to intervene in the activities of religious institutions. 24 Between these two extremes, there is an endless array of relationships that form between religious institutions and secular states. For example, countries such as France and Turkey have secular governments and are not proponents of a secular ideology that values religion negatively, such as the atheism of communist countries, but they are much more assertive in mandating a public secularism than is the United States (Kuru 2009).25

Regardless of the relations between religion and state, however, past research has shown that religious minorities are the most frequent targets of restrictions on religious freedoms. In 1999, when over 10,000 Falun Gong adherents surrounded a Beijing leadership compound in a silent protest to seek recognition as a legitimate spiritual movement, they faced an immediate reaction from the state. Scholars later estimated “35,000 practitioners had been detained, 300 jailed, 5,000 sent to labor camps, and 50 committed to mental hospitals” (Richardson and Edelman 2004: 368). Even in stable democracies, fears persist about religious groups acting as a danger to public welfare by using "brainwashing" or "mind control" to secure the loyalty of members (Richardson and Introvigne 2001). The 2006 report to France's prime minister, Interministerial Mission of Vigilance and Combat against Sectarian Aberrations (MIVILUDES), explained that the “sects” create a “condition of destabilization, disorientation, and vulnerability” and then use reinforcement techniques to reconstruct individuals’ personalities (Roulet 2006: 23). The MIVILUDES report, in short, concluded that sects use devious and powerful psychological methods to take advantage of vulnerable citizens. Although a long line of research refutes the argument that religious minorities have the capacity for “mind control,” “brainwashing” or personality reconstruction, the media, general public and even state agencies continue to harbor such fears.26

Religions also have deep and historic cultural relationships with specific regions or an entire nation. These relationships are often complex, lengthy and entwined with the larger culture. As a result, dominant religions can appeal to the history and culture of their country to provide motivation to deny religious freedoms and even to justify violence. The case study of India will offer detailed examples of how religious movements, political parties, and formal religious institutions all use ties between religion and culture to justify harsh restrictions. Many national and cultural identities are so closely interwoven with or against selected religions that ensuring religious freedoms for all is perceived as challenging the cultural identity as a whole.

These appeals to a distinctive identity can reduce religious freedoms when accompanied with pushes for formal restrictions on other religions. Recent research has shown that social pressure is one of the most powerful predictors of states enacting formal restrictions on religion and

24 The 1990 Smith vs Oregon decision was perceived by many as challenging the "compelling interest" test (McConnell 1990; Wood 1990). We agree that this has reduced the judicial use of this test, but "compelling interest" remains an important criterion for evaluating the boundaries for religious freedom.  
25 In part, some of these differences between France and the United States can be explained by the differences between civil law and common. For civil law countries, such as France, the law must explicitly allow for an action or it is considered banned. In common law countries, such as the United States, actions must be explicitly banned or the state must have a compelling public interest for banning the action.  
26 The research finds that the vast majority of the groups are not a danger to the individual or society and none hold the powers of mental manipulation or brainwashing, despite the high level of membership commitment to the group. See, for example: Shupe and Bromley (1980); Barker (1984); Stark and Bainbridge (1985).
often reflect sharp tensions between religions (Grim and Finke 2011; Finke and Martin 2011). These pressures can also enhance the enforcement of formal restrictions and can maintain informal restrictions even before formal laws are passed.27

Social pressures are especially powerful at the local level where administrative units, such as religious bureaus, are vulnerable to their influences. Given substantial discretion on how to interpret laws for registering, defining or tolerating religions, religious bureaus often serve to favor the majority. Evidence of these pressures has been documented at length in qualitative research and formal documents reporting on religious freedoms.28 Even when local officials do not place undue restrictions on religious groups, they may overlook violations of promised freedoms. In Russia, for example, groups registered as nontraditional religious groups, such as Pentecostals, Catholics, Baptists and Jehovah’s Witnesses, have complained bitterly that the police fail to protect them from acts of vandalism and are slow to respond when intruders interrupt their worship services or even attack them.29 Hence, even without formal restrictions on religion, cultural pressures and informal controls can restrict freedoms and promote conflict between groups.

Thus far, this report has stressed the distinctive qualities of religion and religious freedoms, but religious freedoms are embedded within a much larger bundle of civil liberties. Not surprisingly, the support for religious freedom is highly correlated with support for other civil liberties (Grim and Finke 2010:206). But as shown in Figure 2 on page 5, protecting liberties requires more than constitutional assurances. Unless state institutions provide the authority and support needed to protect liberties, the promises of freedom are never honored.

In the end, religious freedoms rely on the same institutions as other human rights for support and protection, but religions often hold distinctive and complex relationships with the state and the larger culture. These complex relationships are sometimes interwoven with violence toward religion, violence by religion, and violence that has seemingly few religious ties. These are the relationships we explore in the final section of this global overview.

**Religious Freedom’s Relationship with Social Conflict**

Even though the connection between religion and social conflict is seemingly obvious, this relationship has received remarkably little research attention. The relationship between religious freedoms and social conflict has received even less. The following section reviews this relationship and the strong associations between measures of religious freedoms and measures of social conflict. We recognize, of course, that even a high correlation does not demonstrate causation. Religious freedoms and social conflict are tightly interwoven with many other social, cultural and economic factors, factors that might lead to both religious restrictions and social conflict. Yet the strong associations help us to identify relationships that need to be explored more fully in the case studies that follow. Many of these associations have been tested using multivariate analysis and a strong relationship remains.

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27 See Shterin & Richardson (1998) for one example.
28 See for example Richardson (2004) and the International Religious Freedom Reports (http://www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/).
29 The complaints are ongoing and come from many sources. For examples, see U.S. Department of State (2006); Fagan (2006).
A starting point for looking at the relationship between religious freedoms and social conflict is to review how state restrictions on religion are related to conflict. These restrictions serve as perhaps the most obvious source of grievances for religious groups. Table 1 offers two measures of such restrictions. The first is an index based on six measures of religious freedom, including items about:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government Restrictions on Religion</th>
<th>Violent Social Conflict is Present (ISC = 1)</th>
<th>Religion-Related Violence is Widespread</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low, 0 (n=30)</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium, 1-5 (n=58)</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High, 6-10 (n=51)</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government Interference in Religious Worship</th>
<th>Violent Social Conflict is Present (ISC = 1)</th>
<th>Religion-Related Violence is Widespread</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Interference (n=49)</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some Interference (n=55)</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severe Interference (n=35)</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government as Protector</th>
<th>Violent Social Conflict is Present (ISC = 1)</th>
<th>Religion-Related Violence is Widespread</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independence of Judiciary</td>
<td>Generally Independent (n=56)</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Partially/Not Independent (n=82)</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Free and Fair Electoral Process</th>
<th>Violent Social Conflict is Present (ISC = 1)</th>
<th>Religion-Related Violence is Widespread</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Freedom, 10-12 (n=53)</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium, 4-9 (n=45)</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low, 0-3 (n=41)</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Free Functioning of Government</th>
<th>Violent Social Conflict is Present (ISC = 1)</th>
<th>Religion-Related Violence is Widespread</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High, 10-12 (n=33)</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium, 4-9 (n=64)</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low, 0-3 (n=42)</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note: The ISC measure is a composite from the years 2004 and 2005 as described in Appendix C. The measures of religion-related violence and government restrictions of worship derive from ARDA researchers’ coding of the U.S. State Department’s 2005 International Religious Freedom reports; these reports contain data collected from July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2005. The measure of judicial independence cited above is the INJUD measure developed by and available from Cingranelli and Richards (2010) and assesses the independence of national judiciaries in 2005. Measures of free elections and government functionality are available from the 2006 Sub-category Score documents downloadable from Freedom House (2011); the scores from the 2006 dataset reflect the status of elections and government in 2005.)
freedoms to preach, proselytize, worship, and conduct mission work as well as general questions about the state's policy and respect for religious freedoms. Scores for the Government Restrictions Index (GRI) vary from 0 to 10, with higher scores representing higher levels of restriction, but we collapse the scores into three categories to increase the number of cases in each category and to make the table more readable. The second measure isolates one of the six questions used to construct the index: does the government interfere with an individual's right to worship?

Regardless of the social conflict measure used, the pattern is clear: denying religious freedoms is associated with higher levels of social conflict. A sharp jump is seen when moving from states with virtually no restrictions to states that impose some restrictions on religious freedoms regardless of the measure used. The relationship is especially striking with regard to violence related to religion. None of the countries with a “low” score on the GRI were reported to have widespread violence related to religion. In contrast, 45 percent of the countries with “high” levels of government restriction were coded as having such violence.

A perplexing finding of early research on religious freedoms is that despite the frequent denial of religious freedoms, most countries’ constitutions contain constitutional assurances of these freedoms. As reviewed earlier, some of these promises are nullified by other areas of the same constitution and others are diluted by additional legislation. Civil law and common law also place different demands on state enforcement. Whereas countries using civil law explicitly allow an action or else it is considered banned, common law countries must either explicitly ban an action or the state must have a compelling public interest to do so. As a result, what initially appears to be a clear constitutional promise of religious freedom to outsiders may never have been intended to provide full religious freedom.

But even when the constitutional clauses are clear and religious freedoms are explicitly promised, there are no assurances that freedoms will be protected. The state must be held accountable for enforcing these promises and there must be mechanisms that are capable of doing so. Free and fair elections combined with open political participation are often identified as key protectors of civil rights. Although the will of the religious and cultural majority can be imposed through popular legislation, elections help to protect the freedoms of the majority by serving as avenues for public input into policymaking. For religious groups and individuals, the judiciary is especially crucial for protecting freedoms because the harshest restrictions on religion are typically imposed on religious minorities. Past attention has often narrowly focused on the enactment of various versions of Sharia law, but this narrow focus has distracted from the more general principles explaining the relationship between religious freedoms and the courts. Of particular interest is the level of independence judicial systems hold from other state institutions and from religious institutions and movements. An impartial and independent judiciary offers guarantees of minority rights when such rights are protected in law and an institutional avenue to ensure that these rights are upheld. Finally, the protection of any freedom relies on the government's ability to monitor, enforce and protect.

The government's inability or unwillingness to protect freedoms is also related to social conflicts, especially those related to religion. Just as formal government restrictions on religion can be associated with social conflict, the failure to uphold religious freedoms can also be associated with social conflict. Table 1 on the previous page offers a look at these relationships. The independence of the judiciary, a free and fair electoral process, and an open government that functions with relatively little corruption are all associated with higher levels of religious freedoms and less social conflict; the relationships all point in the directions expected. To the extent that governments are effective in protecting religious freedoms, social conflict tends to decline.
Despite the strong relationship that exists between social conflict and government restrictions on religious freedoms—as well as the government's capacity to ensure those freedoms—initial research studies have found that an even stronger relationship exists between social conflict and social restrictions on religion (Finke and Harris 2012). As reviewed earlier, social institutions and movements outside of the government as well as the culture as a whole can be powerful predictors of restricting religious freedoms. These same forces are also strongly related to social conflict.

Two measures of social restrictions are presented in the top half of Table 2. The Social Restrictions Index (SRI), like the GRI, is composed of multiple measures, including attitudes towards religious conversion, proselytizing and minority religions. The scores range from 0 to 10, with higher scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Restrictions on Religion</th>
<th>Violent Social Conflict is Present (ISC=1)</th>
<th>Religion-Related Violence is Widespread</th>
<th>Fragile State Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Restrictions Index (SRI)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low, 0-3 (n=38)</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium, 4-6 (n=49)</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High, 7-10 (n=52)</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goals of Social Movements</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support religious freedoms (n=80)</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seek power/hegemony for one religion (n=59)</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion and Society</th>
<th>Social Isolation Index</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low, 0-1 (n=86)</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium, 2-3 (n=34)</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High, 4-10 (n=19)</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious discrimination</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None or Limited (n=102)</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widespread (n=37)</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note: The ISC measure is a composite from the years 2004 and 2005 as described in Appendix C. All other measures in this table derive from ARDA researchers’ coding of the U.S. State Department’s 2005 International Religious Freedom reports; these reports contain data collected from July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2005. Fragile states were those with scores in the fourth and fifth quintile of the World Bank’s 2004 Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) ratings.)

30 See Appendix B to review the items used in the index or go to (http://www.theARDA.com/) and review the indexes given in the National Profiles.
indicating higher levels of social restriction, but we have again collapsed them into three categories for reporting in the table. The second measure examines the agendas of religious social movements in countries. Do these social movements seek hegemony or dominance for a single religion? The responses are collapsed into two categories: countries where social movements generally support religious freedom and countries where such movements seek power for a single religion.

Both social restriction measures hold a very strong relationship with social conflict. As the SRI rises and social movements seek hegemony for a single religion, the prevalence of social conflict using both of the measures in Table 2 increases sharply. Of the countries with low scores on the SRI, only eight percent are sites of religion-related violence and a mere five percent are sites of violent social conflict as measured by the ISC. This is in distinct contrast with countries that score high on the SRI, of which 50 percent are sites of widespread religion-related violence and violent social conflict. A similar relationship exists between social movements and conflict. Nearly one-half of the countries with social movements that seek power for a single religion report violent conflict or widespread religion-related violence. By comparison, only 19 percent of the countries without social movements of this type report violent conflict captured by the ISC measure and a mere eight percent report religion-related violence.

Multivariate analysis (not shown) confirms that social restrictions and social movements in particular are associated with higher levels of social conflict, regardless of the controls entered (Finke and Harris 2012). The final column of Table 2 offers additional evidence that the strength of the relationship between society-level restrictions on religion and social conflict is not due to some other state-level characteristic, such as the fragility of the state. Using the concept of state fragility, as measured by the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) ratings, we find that social restrictions on religion are neither more nor less severe in fragile states than they are in stable states. Likewise, religious discrimination, the social isolation of religious groups, and the goals of religious social movements are not strongly related to the fragility of the state. Based on this initial glimpse at the data, there is no significant bivariate relationship between the fragility of the state and the social restrictions on religion.

The tables illustrate the strong relationship violence holds with social and governmental restrictions on religion, but they do not fully illustrate the embedded relationships that the various types of restrictions hold with each other and with violent social conflict. Although not shown in the tables, it is important to note that social restrictions, government restrictions and religion-related violence are often components of ongoing cycles of repression. Religion-related violence or even a perceived threat of violence inspires social movements and members of society to call for greater state and social restrictions. The ensuing increases in restrictions in turn contribute to more violence related to religion. Each phenomenon influences and reinforces the other.

Finally, state and social restrictions on religious freedom often lead to social, political and economic conditions that accentuate tensions and discrimination across religious groups. Hence, even when religion is not the primary driver of social conflict, denial of religious freedoms can factor into the conditions that lead to the conflict. A long line of research and theory has shown that a lack of social contact, equal status and cooperative actions can all contribute to social conflict. This suggests that

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31 See Appendix C for details on the construction of this state fragility measure.
32 One of the most enduring social scientific explanations for explaining inter-group conflict is some form of contact theory. Versions of the theory were evident in the 1940s, but it was psychologist Gordon
to the extent that formal and informal restrictions on religious freedoms reduce cooperative contact, restrictions on religion have the potential to increase social conflict.

Recent data collections confirm that denying religious freedoms often results in higher levels of segregation among religious groups and increases in discrimination against religious groups, especially minority religious groups (Finke and Harris 2012). The Isolation Index shown in Table 2 offers a summary measure of isolation or segregation based on religion. This three-item index includes measures of discrimination, displacement and government settlement policies on religion. Once again the index scores have been collapsed into three categories for presentation. Table 2 demonstrates that social isolation is strongly related to violent conflict regardless of the measure used, but this relationship is remarkably strong when considering religion-related violence. Such violence is evident in eighty percent of the countries with the highest level of religious segregation, but occurs in only six percent of the countries with little or no religious segregation.

Along with reducing the contact between religious groups, restricting religious freedoms also gives rise to unequal status positions between religious groups and more social and economic discrimination based on religious identity. Using a measure of religious discrimination in the areas of education, housing and employment, Table 2 reveals that increased discrimination based on religion is associated with higher levels of social conflict. Thus, even when grievances are based on social or economic concerns, the denial of religious freedoms can accentuate inequities and grievances.

The global overviews of religious freedoms, social conflict and the relationships they hold with each other point to several areas in need of further exploration. The unique relationship between religion and the state is an important starting point, but the unique relationship religion holds with the larger culture and with institutions and movements beyond the state are also crucial to understand. The case studies will allow us to take a closer look at these complex relationships.

**Case Studies**
The cases explored in the following section illustrate a few of the connections between religious freedoms and violent conflict described above. Each of the case studies describes a country or region that has been the site of a social conflict and explores how religious freedoms or the lack of such freedoms relate to the onset or persistence of the conflicts. The case studies examine societies or regions from among five of the six larger regions of the globe used by the U.S. Department of State, and each addresses a different type of religion-state relationship. In Africa, we show how restrictions on religious freedoms at the societal and especially the state level in Sudan were part of the long conflict to create a religiously uniform society. A study of the three states in the Southern Caucasus, part of the region of Europe and Eurasia, explores how religion and ethnicity are embedded in one another and help set the stage for frictions between ethno-religious movements. Vietnam, in the East Asia and Pacific region, is a state that has historically viewed religion both as a source of ideological competition and as an institution to be used to legitimate the government; it is also an example of a state in conflict with members of religious groups whose religious practice the state does not recognize as legitimate. In the region of South and Central Asia, India demonstrates how potent social restrictions on religious worship can be in exacerbating conflict between identity groups.

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*Allport’s (1954) *The Nature of Prejudice* that provided the most detailed, convincing, and enduring introduction. For a recent review see Pettigrew and Tropp (2006).*
Finally, in the Western Hemisphere, a study of Guyana demonstrates how religious diversity need not be a precondition for conflict along religious lines even when interethnic conflict is present.

Our focus on nations with internal conflicts, however, should not suggest that any country is exempt from the conflicts related to religion or from efforts to restrict religious freedoms. Although the United States is frequently offered as a country with high levels of religious freedom and low levels of social conflict, religious freedoms are challenged on a routine basis in America and the potential for religiously motivated conflict has been present throughout American history. Before we review case studies where conflict is present and religious freedoms are often denied, we offer a couple brief examples to illustrate the fragility of religious freedoms and the potential for violence related to religion, even in America.

It is tempting to conclude that religious freedoms are securely embedded in the American culture and that structural supports for preserving these freedoms are seldom needed. Over 200 years of American history have shown, however, that religious minorities rely on the protection of the state, and the courts in particular, for ensure their religious freedoms. Whether it is the Baptists and Methodist of the late 18th century or the Muslims, Hindus and new sects of today, the religious freedoms of minority religions are frequently challenged. Consider that from 1938 to 1946 alone, the Jehovah's Witnesses were involved in twenty-three Supreme Court rulings, prompting Supreme Court Justice Harlan Fiske Stone to note that “[Jehovah's Witnesses] ought to have an endowment in view of the aid which they give in solving the legal problems of civil liberties.”

Regardless of the time period, religious minorities in America have relied on the state for protection of these freedoms. American history has also demonstrated the capricious will of the majority. Like any freedoms, religious freedoms are often inconvenient or even undesirable for government authorities and the cultural majority to maintain. Even when freedoms seem securely embedded in the culture and strongly supported by the majority, the support can erode quickly. Consider that a national survey in the year 2000 conducted by the First Amendment Center found that nearly 73 percent of Americans agreed that “the freedom to worship as one chooses . . . applies to all religious groups regardless of how extreme their beliefs are.” Seven years later, and six years after 9-11, the percentage of Americans who agreed with that statement dropped to 56%. Valuing freedom in principle is not the same as valuing freedom for all.

Examples also abound regarding how religious freedoms helped to defuse potential violent conflicts in the United States. Recall the tensions between Catholics and Protestants in the nineteenth century. Lyman Beecher, an influential and highly regarded pastor, warned of a plot by the Pope to seize the Mississippi Valley and his son Edward wrote a book on the *Papal Conspiracy Exposed*. Social and political movements such as the Know-Nothings and the Ku Klux Klan were openly anti-Catholic and, at times, approved of or committed acts of violence against Catholics. Yet despite the perception that Catholics posed a threat, violence committed against them was remarkably limited and Catholics were never deprived of their religious freedoms. More recently the 2007 global survey by the Pew

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33 As quoted in Peters (2000).
34 The results are based on the First Amendment Center’s annual State of the First Amendment survey conducted by the Center for Survey Research and Analysis at the University of Connecticut. Results from the survey were downloaded from the Association of Religion Data Archives, ([www.theARDA.com](http://www.theARDA.com)).
35 Both surveys were conducted by the Center for Survey Research and Analysis at the University of Connecticut. Results from the survey were downloaded from the Association of Religion Data Archives, ([www.theARDA.com](http://www.theARDA.com)).
Research Center found that Muslims in the United States were more integrated into the American culture than their co-religionists in Europe and were far less likely to approve of terrorist acts.\(^{36}\) It is impossible to determine how history may have unfolded differently had freedoms of religion not been upheld for these groups, but it is clear that these have allowed Catholics, Muslims and members of other religions easier entry into the larger American society. It is also clear that religious freedoms are frequently challenged in the United States and around the globe.

This quick scan of American history illustrates several key points about religious freedoms and social conflict. First, the rights of minority religious groups are frequently challenged by the dominant religions and by greater society. Whether it is the Know Nothing movement of the 1850s or the anti-cult movement of the 1970s, dominant religious and social movements challenge the rights of the minority religions. Second, religious minorities rely on the courts for protections. Free elections and transparent legislation do not ensure freedoms, given that both the electoral majority and the state can find freedoms inconvenient or even threatening. From Jehovah's Witnesses seeking converts to Muslims entering the American public sphere, new religions can be loathed or feared by the majority. Third, ensuring religious freedoms helps to diffuse social conflicts between religious groups and others. Whether it is the state, other religious movements or the larger culture, religious freedoms counter the grievances of religious minorities and serve to protect these minorities from the state and from religious and social movements. Even in America, where many take pride in the religious freedoms provided for all, the freedoms require ongoing protection from the courts and the state as a whole.

When the Puritans arrived in America, they sought religious freedom, but they didn't seek religious freedom for all. In fact, they soon banished those who maintained alternative religious beliefs. Freedoms in any land are fragile and are often against the interests of those in power. The following case studies will explore the struggles for religious freedoms across the globe and how these struggles are related to larger social conflicts.

**SUDAN**

The northeast African country of Sudan has been gripped by nearly incessant violent conflict since its independence from joint British-Egyptian rule in 1956. A series of uprisings, coups and civil wars has turned Sudan into one of the world’s most active conflict zones over the past half-century. The longest-running conflict in Sudan pitted the predominantly Muslim, Arabized northern Sudan against the more religiously heterogeneous south in a civil war that began in 1955 prior to independence. After an interregnum from 1972 to 1983 during which the south exercised a greater degree of autonomy from the central government, conflict resumed and did not formally conclude until 2005 (BBC News 2011b; Deng 1995). Between 1983 and 2001, more than 1.9 million Sudanese were killed in the conflict, a civilian death toll larger than any conflict since the Second World War (U.S. Committee for Refugees 2001). The North-South conflict formally concluded in 2005, yet a second conflict in the western Darfur region of Sudan has led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people since 2003, widespread human rights abuses and the indictment of Sudanese President al-Bashir by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity (Amnesty International 2011).

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\(^{36}\) The Pew Research Center (2007).
While the long-running conflict between the northern and the recently-seceded southern region of Sudan was motivated by more than just differences over religion, the Sudanese example demonstrates how severe religious restrictions can fuel and exacerbate social conflict. A common pattern in religion-state relations across the globe is for the state to decrease the scope of acceptable religious practice. As shown earlier, this can take the form of restrictions on public worship or limitations on the religious rights of select religious minorities. Sudan, however, illustrates this pattern in a far more extreme fashion. Both the state and society at large have worked to merge Sudanese citizenship with the practice of Islam, not just by marginalizing and discriminating against non-Muslims, but through unofficial state actions that promote the conversion of non-Muslim Sudanese to Islam. As reviewed below, this extreme form of religious restriction has exacerbated social conflict by compounding minority grievances, emboldening the actions of government and social forces seeking the religious dominance of Muslims, and fostering social separation between religious groups and blatant religious discrimination.

Religious, Demographic and Governmental Background

At the start of 2011, Sudan was the 29th most populous country in the world, with more than 45 million people residing within its borders; the secession of South Sudan reduced the population of Sudan proper by about 8.3 million people (Central Intelligence Agency 2011). The vast majority of the post-secession Sudanese population is Muslim. According to the World Christian Database (2011b), about 91% of the country’s population was Muslim, and nearly all of the Muslims in Sudan are Sunni (U.S. Department of State 2010f). Small percentages of the population are Christian and ethnoreligionist, the World Christian Database’s (2011e) term for those who practice religions closely tied with their ethnic group; this term is usually employed to refer to animists or polytheists. Estimates vary on the religious composition of South Sudan. The World Christian Database (2011b) estimates that about 60% of the new country’s population is Christian, about a third are ethnoreligionist and most of the remaining population is Muslim, while the U.S. State Department’s (2010f) pre-secession figures imply that many of those who are counted as Christians in the World Christian Database figures practice this religion in tandem with indigenous beliefs.

Sudan has been ruled by Umar al-Bashir since a military coup in 1989. al-Bashir’s Revolutionary Command Council appointed him president of the Republic in 1993 (Sidahmed 1996). He has been subsequently re-elected president in votes that have been criticized for not meeting international standards, most recently in 2010 (Smith et al. 2010; Freedom House 2009). al-Bashir’s National Congress Party dominated Sudanese politics until the conclusion of the civil war in 2005; the subsequent peace agreement led to the creation of a transitional authority comprised of representatives from northern and southern Sudan. A judicial system operates in the country but is not independent of the executive. The higher courts are especially susceptible to external influence from other state bodies, while security and military courts do not enforce the country’s legal standards (Freedom House 2009).

Government Restriction and Favoritism of Religion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Profile of Sudan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population, 2011: 45,048,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Restrictions Index (GRI), 2008: 6.94 out of 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Favoritism of Religion Index (GFI), 2008: 8.67 out of 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Restrictions Index (SRI), 2008: 10.00 out of 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion-related Violence Score, 2008: 3 out of 3 (indicates ongoing war with violence related to religion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Social Movements Score, 2005: 3 out of 3 (indicates that social movements sought hegemony for a religious brand or campaign against other brands through nationally coordinated means)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sudan’s transitional 2005 constitution provides for the freedom to worship as one sees fit. Religious discrimination is formally prohibited, and the only example of religious favoritism in the constitution is the recognition of Sharia (or Islamic law) as a source of law only in what was formerly northern Sudan. However, these constitutional protections are not upheld in practice, and other laws and practices of the Sudanese state violate its citizens’ religious freedoms. Sharia was formally imposed on the entire country in 1983 and served as law throughout the whole of the former unified Sudan, not just the northern, heavily-Muslim region (Fox 2008). Non-Muslims are subject to the obligations of Islamic law, despite President Nimeiry’s protestations upon the implementation of Sharia that this would not be the case (Warburg 2003). Muslims who convert to another religion may be executed under the law, though there have been no reported instances of capital punishment for converts (U.S. State Department 2010f). Those who are deemed to have insulted Islam, including journalists, may be imprisoned (Fox 2008). The level of government-enforced restrictions on religion, as coded by researchers at the Association of Religion Data Archives (the ARDA) from the U.S. Department of State’s International Religious Freedom report for Sudan, is quite high: Sudan earned a score of 6.94 out of 10 on the GRI for 2008, with a score of 10 signifying the maximum intensity of restrictions on religion enforced by the state. This score places Sudan among the top 25% most restrictive countries in the world, among those countries with populations greater than two million.

As reflected by the high GRI score, non-Muslims consistently receive unfavorable treatment from the state. Religious groups must register with the state in order to meet legally, and the state regularly denies registration to Christian groups. Since 2005, only three new Christian churches received official approval and have begun construction (U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom 2011). Due to disagreements over the registration status of the Catholic Church, Catholics have had a particularly difficult time in Sudan, as the state harasses Catholic priests and does not permit the construction of new Catholic churches. Educators who were not Muslim were relieved of their jobs after the Islamization of education in Sudan in 1992, and all Christian radio broadcasts were banned in that same year (Fox 2008). The country’s educational curriculum stereotypes non-Muslims in negative ways and does not reference their positive contributions to the country (U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom 2011).

Practice of Islam is subsidized by the state, which provided funds to build mosques in the northern states, but the government also exerts control over Muslim religious practice. The state appoints and may dismiss imams at will, and imams who are accused of inciting hatred or promoting violence may be censured (U.S. State Department 2010f). Yet Muslims receive preferential treatment in Sudan relative to non-Muslims. The judicial system favors Muslims over non-Muslims in court cases, and Muslims have greater access to government services (U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom 2011). The combination of the state’s subsidization of Islam and its unequal treatment of Muslims and non-Muslims earned it a score of 8.67 out of 10 (with a score of 10 indicating the highest level of favoritism) on the Government Favoritism Index, or GFI, for the year 2008 based on the coding of the U.S. Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report for Sudan conducted by researchers at the Association of Religion Data Archives (the ARDA).

37 Each case study is accompanied by a short data profile. The 2011 population of each country is derived from the 2011 U.S. Census Bureau’s International Data Base estimates. All other data in the profiles are derived from the Association of Religion Data Archives’ coding of the U.S. Department of State’s International Religious Freedom reports released in the year designated.

**Social Restriction of Religion**

Restrictions on religion are the norm at the social as well as at the state level. Social restrictions on religion, according to the ARDA’s measure of this phenomenon, include hostility toward non-traditional religions and attempts to shut out these religions from acceptance in society, as well as a strong resistance to non-traditional religions attempts to win converts. Muslims converting to Christianity face intense pressure from broader society to renounce their conversions. A newspaper editor who published an article that raised controversy over the origins of the Prophet Mohammad was murdered in 2006, and the government charged sixteen individuals in connection with the murder. Eight of these individuals were later executed (U.S. Department of State 2009). In addition, there has long been pressure on female university student in Sudan to wear headscarves in classes; the Department of State has noted the existence of this social pressure in each of its last four annual International Religious Freedom Reports on the country. Sudan earned the highest possible score on the ARDA’s measure of social restriction of religion for the year 2008 of 10 out of 10.

**Social Conflict in Sudan: Civil Wars between North and South**

The causes of Sudan’s two civil wars in the modern era are not reducible to differences over religion—other factors, such as the exclusion of the south from real political representation in the central government and the economic marginalization of the region, interacted to fuel the conflict—but, as Ali and his colleagues (2005) wrote, “there is little doubt that the Sudanese conflict was… about fundamental differences on culture, religion and identity.” Government actions that were flagrant violations of minorities’ religious freedoms in Sudan helped sustain the conflict and contributed to the grievances of the minorities. Formal and informal pressures to convert southern Christians and ethnoreligionists to Islam stimulated resentment of the northern-led government and were among the key reasons that southern Sudan did not wish to be ruled by the autocratic North Sudanese regime (Deng 2001). These extreme forms of religious restriction were compounded by social restrictions on minority religions, favoring Muslims in society and diminishing the position of non-Muslims, especially converts from Islam. The governmental and social restrictions on religion served to isolate Muslims and non-Muslims from one another and limited opportunities for compromise and interreligious understanding, thus increasing the likelihood that conflict between these groups would perpetuate itself in Sudan.

Independence in 1956 created a country made up of large population blocs with very little in common with one another culturally, religiously, or ethnically. The northern Sudanese identify themselves as Arabs rather than as Africans, both racially and culturally, and adherence to Islam is a principal component of north Sudanese identity. Moreover, governments in the pre-colonial and post-independence eras viewed Islamic affiliation and Arabization as central to Sudanese identity more broadly; they worked to continue the Arabization and Islamization of Sudan further southward prior to independence were disrupted by geographic barriers and by armed resistance from the non-Arab southern Sudanese tribes (Deng 1995). Under British-Egyptian rule, the peoples of the north and the south were deliberately kept isolated; southern Sudan was designated a “Closed District,” and travel to the South was heavily restricted in an attempt to promote the development of a distinctly African South Sudanese society (Idris 2005). The major ethnic and religious groups in Sudan, in short, have long been in a state of forced isolation, a state which we argue is conducive to greater probabilities of conflict between peoples.

The legacy of this social isolation is the government policy of Islamization of the south, the attempt to create a religiously homogeneous Sudanese population and erase the country’s history of religious diversity. Forced isolation reduces opportunity for identity groups to resolve their grievances through
cooperation and compromise, and it also increases the likelihood that dominant identity groups—be they religious or ethnic in origin—will try to impose their wills on minority groups. Contact between the groups when the country was unified, when such contact did occur, was marked by discrimination against minority religions, which is captured in Sudan’s high level of social restrictions against religion that persists to this day.

The post-independence governments, dominated by Arab-Muslim North Sudanese, sought to Islamize the southern region of the country soon after independence and were met by violent, sustained resistance from the south. The government was motivated out of a desire to unify the nation under a single religion—Islam—and foster the sort of national unity that Sudan had never enjoyed in the past. Yet south Sudan was not a religious vacuum to be filled through conversion to Islam, as Christianity and a number of indigenous faiths were already well established in the region prior to independence. Governments in the latter half of the 20th century made the adoption of Islam by the south into official policy through the adoption of Sharia throughout the country and the passage of other laws designed to punish those who violated tenets of Islamic law (Idris 2005; Deng 1995).

State restrictions on religious freedom contributed directly to the resumption of hostilities between northern and southern forces in 1983 after an eleven-year lapse. The 1972 agreement that recognized the regional autonomy of southern Sudan was broken by the central government, essentially revoking the autonomy of the region. Alongside that revocation came President Nimeiry’s imposition of Sharia law across the country and the passage of other laws that carried gruesome penalties for violating Islamic codes, such as beatings and the amputation of violators’ limbs. This program of Islamizing the country’s laws was one of the principal reasons that the southern rebels under the direction of John Garang decided to re engage the central government in open warfare (Deng 1995).

Nimeiry was removed from power in 1985, but an explicitly Islamist regime was installed in Sudan following the 1989 coup (Deng 2001). Inspired and largely directed by National Islamic Front leader Hasan al-Turabi, the regime recommitted itself to a project of religious coercion and indoctrination with the goal of transforming Sudan into a model Islamist state (Gallab 2008). The backlash to the state’s coercive efforts to Islamize southern Sudan ultimately increased the salience of Christianity as an integral aspect of Southern Sudanese identity and further isolated the peoples of the two regions (Deng 2001). In short, the state’s attempt to undermine the religious diversity of its people worked to stimulate conflict between the two regions, especially before al-Turabi was sidelined and arrested by President al-Bashir’s forces in 1999.

The government’s resistance to the indigenous religious pluralism in the country, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, exacerbated the political and economic grievances the people of Sudan’s southern region held against the north and served to heighten the importance of religious identity as a marker of difference between peoples. The alliance between the state and political Islam at the end of the 20th century did nothing to ease the extant civil war, and it would likely have continued to serve as a barrier to reconciliation had the al-Turabi-led Islamists not lost sway in the country in 1999. The civil war drew to a close in 2005, paving the way for the independence of South Sudan in 2011, yet tensions between the two territories remain, especially over the contested borderlands. The conflict in Darfur continues to rage, though that conflict, pitting fellow Muslims against one another, is not viewed as being driven by religious differences (Idris 2005).

Sudan’s civil wars illustrate how state attempts to restrict minority religions for the sake of “national unity” create core grievances that can fuel social conflict. Government restrictions on religious freedom in Sudan are among the primary reasons that the conflict between North and South Sudan
continued across decades of hardship and acrimony. Forced isolation of social groups occurred and occurs due in part to patterns of religious discrimination and restriction, and this isolation helped prevent opposite sides in the conflict from defusing conflicts. In short, restrictions on religious freedom at the state and societal levels as well as the isolation of Sudan’s religious and ethnic identity groups are among the key ingredients that kept the most deadly conflict of the second half of the 20th century alive for so long.

THE CAUCASUS STATES
The breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 redrew the maps of Europe and Asia, and led to the creation of fifteen new independent countries. Three of these new countries are located in the southern Caucasus Mountains near the borders of Europe and Asia: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. These states are no strangers to conflict in the post-Soviet era, as each of them have been parties to an armed conflict either within their borders or with another state at some point since their independence. Both the Georgian and Azerbaijani governments have fought separatist movements within their borders, and Armenia involved itself militarily in the conflict in Azerbaijan on the side of the separatists. This case study focuses primarily on the conflict in Azerbaijan between the central government and the ethnic Armenian separatists in the country’s autonomous Nagorno-Karabakh region, who received military aid from the Armenian state in the conflict.

Some have concluded that religious differences did not heighten the grievances driving the conflict, at least in Nagorno-Karabakh (Chorbajian 1994; see also Altstadt 1996). Yet because of the presence of dominant “ethno-religions” characterized by the embedding of religion in ethnicity as well as the existence of dominant religions supported by the state through shows of favoritism and/or the restriction of minority religions, religious restrictions in the region inevitably limit the freedoms of those minority religions. When religious practice is restricted to the benefit of a single dominant religion, the countries and their majority populations sow the seeds of religious grievance, tolerate or even promote higher levels of social restriction, and fan the flames of social conflict.

Religious, Demographic and Governmental Background
None of the Caucasus states is regarded as an electoral democracy by Freedom House (2009). Azerbaijan has been ruled by members of the Aliyev family since a 1993 military coup overthrew the freely elected president; former Communist Party official Heydar Aliyev came to the presidency in the wake of the coup, and he was succeeded by his son Ilham Aliyev in 2003. Both have won overwhelming majorities in presidential elections that have been described as fraudulent (Freedom House 2009). Armenia has multiple political parties that compete for the presidency and seats in the unicameral legislature, but past elections have not met international standards for fairness according to the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Georgia's 2003 Rose Revolution purported to usher in democratic reforms to the political system in that country (Fairbanks 2004), but the government of President Saakashvili

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Profile of Azerbaijan</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population, 2011: 9,397,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government Restrictions Index (GRI), 2008: 7.22 out of 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Favoritism of Religion Index (GFI), 2008: 1.33 out of 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Restrictions Index (SRI), 2008: 9.33 out of 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion-related Violence Score, 2008: 0 out of 3 (indicates no violence related to religion was reported)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Social Movements Score, 2005: 1 out of 3 (indicates that all social movements exist that are reported either promote religious freedom or do not intimidate people from other religious brands)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
has been accused by Georgia’s human rights ombudsman of returning to its recent authoritarian past (Freedom House 2009). The authoritarianism present in the Caucasus states has threatened the freedoms of each nation’s minorities.

The largest and most populous of the three Caucasian states (Central Intelligence Agency 2011), Azerbaijan is also the only one of these states with a majority Muslim population. Official figures in Azerbaijan indicated that about 96 percent of the population was Muslim in 2010 (U.S. Department of State 2010b), while the World Christian Database (2011a) estimated the number of Muslims to be about 88 percent of the total population. Shi’a Muslims make up 65 percent of the Muslim population and Sunnis make up the remaining 35 percent. The remainder of the population is comprised of Russian and Armenian Orthodox Christians, Jews, other Christian groups, Baha’is and nonbelievers. The Shi’-a-Sunni distinction is not the sort of key social cleavage it has been in other countries with similar proportions of the two Muslim groups (e.g., Iraq), and religious observance is not particularly strong among the majority of Muslims. Indeed, Muslim identity is seen as, in large part, a function of the ethnic identity and culture of the Azeris, who comprise nearly 91 percent of the population (Central Intelligence Agency 2011; U.S. Department of State 2010b).

The smaller, less populous countries of Armenia and Georgia both have large Christian majorities. The Armenian population is made up of approximately 98 percent ethnic Armenians, and about 90 percent of the population is estimated to belong to the Armenian Apostolic Church, an Orthodox Christian faith. The remaining 10 percent of the population is comprised of small bands of adherents to other faiths, such as Roman Catholicism, Judaism, Islam and various Protestant confessions (U.S. Department of State 2010a). Likewise, the Georgian population is comprised mainly of ethnic Georgians; they made up 84 percent of the population as of 2002. Most ethnic Georgians belong to the Georgian Orthodox Church (or GOC). Azeris make up seven percent of the population and are predominantly Muslim, while Armenians comprise six percent of the population and generally belong to the Armenian Apostolic Church. Both groups are clustered in particular regions of the country (U.S. Department of State 2010c).

In each of the three countries there is a dominant religion or church, and there is a close affiliation between identifying with the country’s dominant ethnic group and membership in these religious groups. The strong overlap between a single ethnic identity group and a dominant religion or church has given rise to a dominant “ethno-religion” in each country. The clearest example of this phenomenon is seen in Georgia, where the predominant nationalist movement views membership in the Georgia Orthodox Church as part of the broader Georgian identity. Similar alliances exist in the other Caucasian states. Each of the dominant “ethno-religion” movements in the Caucasian countries demonstrates the capacity to both curtail religious freedoms and to contribute to social conflict.

**Profile of Armenia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>Score</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population, 2011</td>
<td>2,968,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Restrictions Index (GRI), 2008</td>
<td>6.94 out of 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Favoritism of Religion Index (GFI), 2008</td>
<td>3.40 out of 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Restrictions Index (SRI), 2008</td>
<td>9.00 out of 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion-related Violence Score, 2008</td>
<td>1 out of 3 (indicates isolated acts of violence related to religion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Social Movements Score, 2005</td>
<td>3 out of 3 (indicates that social movements seek hegemony for a religious brand or campaign against other brands through nationally coordinated means)</td>
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**Government Restriction and Favoritism of Religion**

While the Georgian government imposes few restrictions on religious practice (scoring 1.67 out of 10 on Government Restrictions), it shows the highest level of favoritism of any of the three Caucasus states (scoring 7.43 out of 10 on Government Favoritism). Some of this favoritism is explicit in the
the Georgian constitution, which acknowledges that the GOC has played a special role in the country’s history; it is also explicit in the curricular advantages that the GOC holds in schools, and in certain preferences shown to the GOC in tax laws (U.S. Department of State 2008c). In contrast, the Armenian and Azerbaijani governments were among the top third of the most religiously restrictive governments in the world (6.94 and 7.22 out of 10), but they score relatively low on religious favoritism (3.40 and 1.33).

Unlike Georgia, no religions are favored by the Armenian or Azerbaijani educational systems and there were no reported financial privileges awarded to one religion over another in either country (U.S. Department of State 2008a, U.S. Department of State 2008b). Yet both states regulated religious practice at far higher levels than does Georgia. In Azerbaijan, Muslim organizations must report to the Caucasian Muslim Board, a government-affiliated organization that monitors sermons and appoints clergy to mosques. Authorities in that country required that religious literature be approved by a government body before it is sold. Travel abroad for religious studies requires government permission, and there were restrictions on proselytizing (U.S. Department of State 2008b). Proselytizing is also banned in Armenia, even for members of the Armenian Church (U.S. Department of State 2008a).

Whether manifested in the religious favoritism of Georgia or in the harsh religious restrictions of Armenia or Azerbaijan, government actions toward religion are also actions against an ethnic minority and often against a select region of the country. The open governmental preference for a single religion also allows for more social restrictions against these minorities.

Social Restriction of Religion
Despite variations across the three countries in levels of government favoritism and restrictions of religion, all three countries have in common high levels of social restrictions on religion. Each country received a score higher than 7 out of 10 on the Social Restrictions Index (SRI) for 2008, indicating high levels of societal restrictions on religious freedom. In Armenia, this is indicative of the general population’s negative attitudes toward minority religious groups, particularly Jehovah’s Witnesses. The U.S. Department of State documented incidents of assaults against Jehovah’s Witnesses in response to requests to engage in Bible study. Religious groups other than the dominant Armenian Apostolic Church were referred to as “sects” across media platforms, and negative programs about these minority religions were transmitted (U.S. Department of State 2008a). Physical assault of religious minorities was not as much of a problem in Georgia in 2008, but there were reports of Georgian Orthodox priests and public school teachers criticizing both minority religious groups and interreligious marriages. Some educators openly ridiculed Protestant and Catholic students for their religion (U.S. Department of State 2008c). Azerbaijani society is characterized by prejudice against Muslims who convert to other religions as well as minority religious groups who proselytize. Azerbaijani media, in both print and broadcast television, has consistently described minority religious groups in threatening terms, arguing that they were undermining the country’s long traditions of interreligious harmony (U.S. Department of State 2008b). When coupled with the government’s preference for a single religion, social restrictions serve to heighten open discrimination and persecution of minorities—actions that can increase the chance of open conflict.
Social Conflict in the Caucasus: The Example of Nagorno-Karabakh

The high levels of religious restrictions, combined with the open discrimination based on ethno-religious identities and the physical isolation of many minorities, have all fanned the flames of social conflict in the Caucasus countries. Because the ethno-religious ties are so strong, restrictions against a religious minority are also restrictions against an ethnic minority, and favoritism toward only one religion openly excludes ethnic minorities. Moreover, restricting some religions and promoting others has also led state officials to tolerate or even promote increased social restrictions on some ethno-religious minorities. Finally, the potential for conflict is heightened even more for religious and ethnic minorities that are physically isolated from the ethnic and religious majority.

The ongoing conflict in the region of Nagorno-Karabakh, a region within the borders of Azerbaijan populated largely by ethnic Armenians, provides an instructive example. The origins of the conflict date back centuries, but the current parameters of the conflict date to the early Soviet era when Moscow awarded the disputed southernmost part of the Caucasus territory to Armenia and the region of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan, despite the fact that its ethnic population was largely Armenian (Altstadt 1996).

Like many forced marriages in the USSR, tensions came to a boil when the former socialist republics no longer answered to Moscow. Nagorno-Karabakh declared its independence from Azerbaijan in 1991 after three years of demonstrations and communal violence. Full-scale war between the political authority in Nagorno-Karabakh and the central authority in Azerbaijan erupted in 1992, with the government of Armenia aiding the breakaway region militarily (Human Rights Watch 1994). Formal hostilities ended in 1994, but there has not been a firm resolution to the conflict; the territory remains an autonomous region within the borders of Azerbaijan. The desire for a largely Armenian-ethnic state is one of the key reasons that hostilities have broken out in the region.

The social conflicts appear to be both the cause and consequence of increased religious restrictions. Conflicts often resulted in calls for more restrictions on minorities. For example, the religious restrictions imposed by local authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh have increased in recent years following previous conflicts. Minority religious groups’ worship ceremonies have been raided in the territory by the authorities of the autonomous region, and police confiscated literature and offertory money from the groups. But the local social attitudes and restrictions have also fueled more restrictions and conflict. Authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh claimed that the raids of worship ceremonies were due to the groups’ registration problems, but as the territory’s religious official explained to one of the affected groups, “We are getting ready for war and we need our nation to be united” (Corley 2010).

Nagorno-Karabakh is a society composed largely of Orthodox Armenians within a larger society of Muslim Azeris. The denial of religious freedoms to minority religious groups within Nagorno-Karabakh serves as a warning of future conflicts between Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan at large. But the physical separation of the two groups, the degree of open discrimination, and the restrictions they impose when they are the dominant ethno-religious group provides the formula for an ongoing cycle of social conflict.

This cycle of increased restrictions and social conflict is not limited to Nagorno-Karabakh. Georgia faces similar challenges in addressing independence movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia within its present borders. Even when we move beyond the Caucasus nations, we find that there is a single, large ethno-religious majority in many of the former Soviet republics that attempts to retain
cultural and political control over minority ethno-religious groups seeking either equal freedoms or complete independence from the dominant group. As the restrictions, isolation and open discrimination increase, however, the likelihood of more social conflict also increases.

**VIETNAM**

In many countries, calls for formal restrictions on religions come from dominant religions who seek to gain from these restrictions or from society at large. As a result, the most severe restrictions on religious practice are often targeted at minority religions. Yet states may have their own incentives to impose restrictions on religions. In Vietnam and other communist countries, religions have been viewed as potential threats to the state, as alternate ideologies and sources of allegiance. In these countries, although minority religions have often faced the harshest restrictions, virtually all religions have faced severe restrictions of some kind. Indeed, violent religious persecution was the norm in the early days of the unified Vietnam. While the Vietnamese government has been more accommodating of religious practice in recent decades, challenges persist for religious groups, especially those not officially recognized by the government. Echoes of past repression remain, as the government periodically cracks down violently on groups outside the circle of approved religious activity. These crackdowns have led to cycles of protest, violence and repression, bringing the state in direct conflict with its own people.

Although violent conflict in Vietnam has not been constant or even particularly widespread, the state does have a record of violent repression against groups who organize to voice their grievances publicly. Some of this repression has taken an explicitly anti-religious form, as the government has tried to force some of its targets to renounce their religious faith and has beaten and tortured citizens on the basis of their religion. Victims of anti-religious oppression from the state are members of religious groups that the Communist Party of Vietnam has identified as a potential threat to the regime’s stability. Vietnam demonstrates that a state may restrict religious practice for its own reasons and not just as a response to pressures from dominant religious groups or the greater society. Regardless of motive, Vietnam provides another example of how attempting to restrict the operations and existence of religious groups can lead to violent unrest in a society.

**Religious, Demographic and Governmental Background**

As of 2011, Vietnam was the 14th-most populous country in the world with about 90.5 million people (U.S. Census Bureau 2011). More than four-fifths of the population are of Viet or Kinh ethnicity, but there are sizeable communities of other groups; Tay, Thai, Muong, Khmer, Hmong, and Nung peoples each make up between one and two percent of the country’s population (Central Intelligence Agency 2011). The religious composition of the population, however, is disputed. Citing official figures from 1999, The World Factbook (Central Intelligence Agency 2011) reports that more than three-quarters of Vietnamese have no religious affiliation; many of those who consider themselves religious elect not to report their religious identity to the government, as one’s religious identity is given on official identification documents (U.S. Department of State 2010g). Contrary to the government’s official figures, the World Christian Database (2011c) estimates that atheists and agnostics make up just one-

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**Profile of Vietnam**

- Population, 2011: 90,549,000
- Government Restrictions Index (GRI), 2008: 8.61 out of 10
- Government Favoritism of Religion Index (GFI), 2008: 6.20 out of 10
- Social Restrictions Index (SRI), 2008: 6.00 out of 10
- Religion-related Violence Score, 2008: 1 out of 3 (indicates isolated acts of violence related to religion)
- Religious Social Movements Score, 2005: 2 out of 3 (indicates that social movements seek hegemony for a religious brand or campaign against other brands through regionally coordinated means)
fifth of the country’s population and that nearly half of Vietnamese are Buddhists. Vietnamese Buddhists often combine elements of Mahayana Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism in their religious practice. There is a Roman Catholic population in the country estimated at 8 million people, and smaller Protestant denominations operate in the country as well (U.S. Department of State 2008g). The World Christian Database (2011c) estimates that ethnoreligionists make up ten percent of the population, and eleven percent belongs to one of a number of new religious movements. There are also small Muslim and Hindu communities in the country. In other words, it appears that there is a great deal more religious diversity in Vietnam than the state presently admits.

The country is a one-party state, and the government is controlled and operated by the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV). Elections to the National Assembly are held, but only candidates approved by the Party-affiliated Vietnam Fatherland Front may run. The National Assembly elects a president who in turn appoints an Assembly-approved prime minister; thus, all of the key political offices in the country are held by leaders approved by the CPV. The judiciary is likewise an arm of the CPV, and lawyers willing to risk Party reprisal in challenging the state are few (Freedom House 2009). Thus, citizens exert very little influence over the functioning of the government and have little recourse when human rights are violated.

**Government Restriction and Favoritism of Religion**

The Vietnamese state employs a comprehensive regulatory regime to oversee religious practice in the country. The government requires that all religious denominations be registered or recognized by the government in order to operate. Recognition may be denied or revoked at will by the state. The Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV), one of the largest Buddhist organizations in the country, is not recognized by the state, and the state has taken steps to restrict the movement of the group’s leaders (U.S. Department of State 2008g). The Vietnam Buddhist Sangha (VBS) is the officially-sanctioned Buddhist organization in the country (U.S. Department of State 2008g); all Buddhist monks are obligated by the government to operate under the auspices of the VBS (Fox 2008). In addition, the government requires that religious leaders be approved before they can serve in their leadership capacities, a policy that includes appointments made by the Vatican to the Catholic clergy (U.S. Department of State 2008g). Proselytizing is restricted in the country: foreigners may not proselytize, and the state discourages proselytizing by Vietnamese citizens that does not occur in designated locations. Vietnam’s constitution recognizes the right to freedom of religion, but it also states that religion and belief may not be used to oppose the policies of the state (Fox 2008). Due in large part to its highly-developed regulatory regime, Vietnam received a score of 8.61 out of 10 on the 2008 Government Restrictions Index (GRI), indicating that religion is heavily regulated by the state.

Six religions are officially recognized by the government: Buddhism, Protestantism, Roman Catholicism, Islam, Cao Dai, and Hoa Hao (Freedom House 2009). Cao Dai is a syncretistic religion that incorporates strands of other religions, and Hoa Hao is an offshoot brand of Buddhism (U.S. State Department 2008g). These religions have been incorporated into the state apparatus by means of supervisory bodies, one for each of the six faiths, which are controlled by Communist Party of Vietnam officials; most religious activities require the approval of these bodies (Freedom House 2009). In recent years, political leaders have participated in these faiths' ceremonies as state representatives. The acceptance of these groups by the state began in 1990, when the Communist Party of Vietnam made a public declaration that the spiritual needs of the citizenry should be recognized and must co-exist with the Party’s ongoing state-building project. Thus, the Party has made the tacit acknowledgment that religion may be controlled to serve the state’s ideological aims (Bouquet 2010). For privileging these religious groups over other, unrecognized groups, Vietnam
earned a score of 6.20 out of 10 on the Government Favoritism Index (GFI), indicating a moderate-to-high level of favoritism shown to particular religions by the state.

**Social Restriction of Religion**
Some tensions exist between Buddhists and members of the burgeoning Protestant churches in Vietnam. These tensions are largely the reason for the country’s score of 6.00 on the Social Restriction of Religion Index for the year 2008, indicating a moderate level of social restriction. In previous years the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom reports for Vietnam did not describe these tensions as acutely, as researchers at the Association of Religion Data Archives (the ARDA) recorded substantially lower scores for the country on this measure. There have been a few recent clashes between groups. For example, members of a Protestant Church in Tra Vinh Province were beaten in the presence of a Khmer Buddhist monk by approximately 200 locals at a local police station, in full view of the authorities (U.S. Department of State 2008g). In practice, however, religious groups in Vietnam generally coexist in peace.

**Social Conflict in Vietnam**
Restrictions on religion in Vietnam have often taken the form of violent repression, and the victims of this repression have responded by intensifying their protests against the state. This has led to a cycle of protest and state-sponsored violence that shows little sign of abating. This pattern occurs largely among religious groups not recognized by the state. Moreover, when those affiliated with an unauthorized religious group are members of a minority ethnicity and espouse a political message in opposition to official state policy, the potential for violence skyrockets. The state’s relationship with the Dega religion offers an obvious example.

Dega Christianity is a form of evangelical Protestantism, and adherents to this form of Christianity are mostly members of the minority Montagnard ethnic groups who live in the country’s Central Highlands. Dega stresses themes of liberation and empowerment; these messages were well-received by the Montagnards, who have long argued for greater autonomy with the ultimate goal of an independent state. These demands were not met by the French colonial government or the subsequent Vietnamese governments. The state does not recognize Dega Christianity as a religion and argues that Dega is a political movement masking its nationalist aims under a religious veneer. The state’s efforts to suppress the religion’s messages, which are in direct conflict with the state’s interests, have resulted in a decade of violent repression and conflict beginning in 2001 (Human Rights Watch 2002, 2011).

The year 2001 saw some of the most violent crackdowns against a religious group in Vietnam’s recent history. The Montagnards engaged in mass demonstrations in February of that year demanding greater religious freedoms and independence from Hanoi. In response, the police swept through Central Highland villages, beating and torturing suspected demonstrators. Authorities regarded the Dega faith as providing the impetus for the demonstrations and allegedly attempted to coerce some of the arrested into signing documents renouncing Christianity (Human Rights Watch 2002). Buddhist sites in the area were also targeted; between 2001 and 2006, more than 1,250 Christian and Buddhist religious sites were closed by the state throughout the Central Highlands (Crispin 2006). Rather than quell Montagnard dissent, the state’s actions intensified the level of conflict; Montagnards conducted further street protests in 2002, 2004 and 2008, which were met with continued violent responses from the state. In 2004, security forces conducted a campaign of raiding villages where Dega Protestants were believed to live, destroying houses and beating their inhabitants, and using dogs to hunt down other suspected Dega Protestants in nearby forests and fields. The government also conducted show
trials in front of villagers, forcing Dega adherents to confess their “wrongdoings” and publicly renounce their faith (Human Rights Watch 2011).

Social conflict in Vietnam is often resolved through the state’s recourse to coercive, sometimes violent means. There have been recurrent waves of civil unrest in the country, motivated largely by economic and social grievances, but also by calls for more extensive religious liberties (Human Rights Watch 2002). While improvements in the status of religious freedom in Vietnam have been sufficient to lead to its removal from the list of the State Department’s Countries of Particular Concern, its high level of restrictions of religion has led to civil unrest and conflict. Vietnam offers an example of how attempts by a government to restrict some religions directly results in higher levels of violence. Much of the violence is directed by the state toward religion, most notably the religions not sanctioned by the state. Similar to other communist states, such as China, the Vietnamese government has abandoned efforts to eliminate religion altogether, yet its attempts to control religion and deny religious freedoms continue to foster higher levels of social conflict.

**INDIA**

India has been wracked by recurring episodes of internal violent conflict ever since its independence from Great Britain. Most of these episodes have pitted religious identity groups, especially the country’s Hindu and Muslim populations, against each other on opposite sides of the violence. Indeed, interreligious “communal violence” has been a fact of life in Indian society since the Partition of India. These episodes often take the form of riots between religious groups or pogroms where one religious group targets another.

The case of India demonstrates that the existence of a representative, multiparty democracy is not a sufficient condition for ensuring religious freedoms or preventing violence related to religion. India provides one of the most straightforward examples in the world of how social restrictions on religion are related to higher levels of violent social conflict. By marginalizing religious minorities and creating a climate where the majority religion can operate more freely than others, restrictions at the societal level in India have raised the temperature on religious identity groups’ grievances with one another. This is true even as the federal government imposes only modest restrictions on religion. Organized social and religious movements have been actively involved in the vigilante policing of religions and are frequently involved in violent clashes. We readily acknowledge the ethnic, linguistic, economic and regional ties that are a part of this complex mixture. But we also emphasize that India shows us how the combination of discriminatory religious social movements and a state apparatus incapable of adequately redressing social grievances—through a judiciary ineffective in protecting religious freedoms and local authorities and laws that are tolerate the behavior of the movement—open social conflict is more likely to occur.

**Religious, Demographic and Governmental Background**

With a population of approximately 1.2 billion, India is the second-most populous country in the world (U.S. Census Bureau 2011). The country is a hotbed of religious diversity and fervor. While Hindus comprise about four-fifths of the population, the country is home to large numbers of adherents to other major world religions. Approximately 150 million Muslims reside in India, about 85 percent of whom are Sunni (U.S. Department of State 2010e). Some sources measure India’s Muslim population as the second largest in the world (World Christian Database 2011d, U.S. Department of State 2010e). More than 26 million Christians and 21 million Sikhs reside there as well, and there are substantial concentrations of Buddhists, Jains, Zoroastrians, Baha’is, Jews and animists in the country. Minority religious groups are distributed across the country but are
in particular states or regions, and form numerical majorities in certain states: Sikhs comprise the majority of the population in the state of Punjab, Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir and Christians in the small north-eastern states of Nagaland, Meghalaya and Mizoram (U.S. Department of State 2010e).

India’s population size and political structure earn it the title of the “world’s largest democracy” (BBC News 2011a). A parliamentary democracy since its independence from Great Britain and subsequent Partition in 1947, India is represented at the federal level by a bicameral legislature. Virtually all members of the Lok Sabha or “House of the People” are elected directly, while most members of the Rajya Sabha or “Council of States” are elected by state legislatures. A president serves a largely symbolic role as the head of state, while the prime minister serves as the country’s chief executive. While the ostensibly secular Congress Party controlled the federal government for most of India’s first half-century of independence, other political parties—most notably the nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)—have held substantial numbers of seats in Parliament and have wielded majorities at times (Freedom House 2009).

**Government Restriction and Favoritism of Religion**

The constitution of India generally supports religious freedom and a pluralist state. Religious practice and profession are guaranteed subject to public order and morality. As noted earlier, there are governmental restrictions on religion at the federal level, but these restrictions are modest relative to other south Asian nations. Foreigners are required to obtain governmental permission to preach throughout the country and religious groups may be banned for a number of reasons, including violations of bans on receiving international funding and encouraging tensions between religious communities. State-level—rather than federal-level—restrictions are more stringent. Six states have “anticonversion” laws that carry penalties for those who are found guilty of trying to convert others to a religion (U.S. Department of State 2010e). Four states regulate the construction of religious buildings, and the state of Uttar Pradesh has denied some Muslim groups that it considers fundamentalist the permission to construct mosques (U.S. Department of State 2010e; Fox 2008).

Based on its coding of the U.S. State Department’s 2008 International Religious Freedom reports, researchers at the Association of Religion Data Archives (the ARDA) assigned India a score of 4.72 out of 10 on Grim and Finke’s Government Restrictions Index (or GRI). India’s GRI score shows that its government imposes substantial but not totalizing restrictions on religious worship. The Indian state’s policies toward religion place it in the middle-tier of countries with populations greater than two million on this measure; its overall level of state-mandated religious restriction is roughly comparable to countries like Turkey and Romania.

ARDA researchers also measured the government’s level of favoritism shown toward particular religious groups using the Government Favoritism Index (or GFI). India earned a score of 6.20 out of 10 on this measure, which demonstrates a moderate-to-high degree of favoritism toward select religious groups. Except for a constitutional provision for the support of Hindu temples in Tamil

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**Profile of India**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population, 2011:</th>
<th>1,189,173,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government Restrictions Index (GRI), 2008:</td>
<td>4.72 out of 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Favoritism of Religion Index (GFI), 2008:</td>
<td>6.20 out of 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Restrictions Index (SRI), 2008:</td>
<td>10 out of 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion-related Violence Score, 2008:</td>
<td>2 out of 3 (Indicates widespread acts of violence related to religion)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Social Movements Score, 2005:</td>
<td>3 out of 3 (indicates that social movements sought hegemony for a religious brand or campaign against other brands through nationally coordinated means)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Nadu state, no one religion is shown constitutional favoritism over another. But India receives this score due to the influence of Hindu nationalism on state and local policy and funding of places of worship. Globally, India is in the middle of the pack in the level of favoritism it shows toward religious groups, well-below countries like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia that subsidize Islamic practice, but substantially above countries like Japan that show little to no favoritism to any religious group.

**Social Restriction of Religion**
India has among the highest levels of social restrictions on religion in the world and a high level of violence directly related to religion. Social and religious movements in particular have attempted to diminish the influence of other religious groups by exerting restrictive pressures on them as well as through direct violent action. As a result ARDA researchers assigned India their highest possible score on the Social Restrictions Index, a 10 out of a possible 10.

Social restrictions on religion in India manifest themselves in a number of ways. For instance, India’s noted caste system continues to cause problems for large portions of society, especially for the Dalits or “untouchables.” Dalits have been forbidden from participating in religious rites in certain locales; for example, violence involving approximately 300 people was reported near Karnataka in 2008 after Dalits commemorated the Ugadi festival in a local Hindu temple, and other Dalits have been attacked for merely attempting to enter temples. Social restrictions are also visible in relations between religious groups. Some in the Hindu community reject the legitimacy of conversions from Hinduism, leading to distrust of proselytizers and violence against would-be converts and those engaged in proselytizing, particularly Christians (U.S. Department of State 2008e).

Social restrictions against free religious practice are directly associated with communal violence in India. Much of the violence has been associated with a continuing battle among these groups to define the Indian nation. Opposing the secularist forces in politics and society in the tradition of Nehru, a coalition of powerful and influential nationalist groups known as the Sangh Parivar promotes the view that adherence to Hinduism, as the country’s majority religion, should define Indian nationality and even citizenship. Sangh Parivar organizations aim to both create a more standardized version of Hinduism in India and to orient public life around the promotion of Hindu identity and nationalism, or Hindutva (Hibbard 2010). This project has been furthered by the Sangh Parivar and its sympathizers not only to define the Hindu religion, but also to redefine India as a Hindu nation (Nandy et al. 1995). Those linked with Sangh Parivar groups have threatened non-Hindu clergy and worshipers with violence, invaded their worship services, stolen their property and physically assaulted them on a massive scale (U.S. Department of State 2008e). Indeed, the lists of violent societal abuses given in the Department of State’s annual reports on religious freedom in India are routinely among the longest and most comprehensive of any world country.

**Social Conflict in India**
PRS Legislative Research (2011) reported that there were 4,030 incidents of communal violence in India between 2005 and 2009. These incidents led to 648 deaths, or about 130 deaths per year. More than 11,000 people were injured in these violent communal clashes. This is not a new phenomenon, as violent conflict between Hindus and Muslims has been ongoing since the Partition of India. Conflict between Hindus and Muslims continued throughout the 1980s and 1990s, culminating in the destruction of the Babri Mosque by Hindu rioters at Ayodhya in 1992. Sangh Parivar groups had

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39 Accessed from the Government of India Ministry of Law and Justice ([http://lawmin.nic.in/coi/coiason29july08.pdf](http://lawmin.nic.in/coi/coiason29july08.pdf)).
long campaigned for the destruction of the mosque (Nandy et al. 1995), and its demolition led to Hindu-Muslim conflicts throughout India that led to the deaths of more than 2,000 people (BBC News 2010). The year 2002 saw another spate of communal violence in Gujarat, where violence between Hindus and Muslims resulted in approximately 2,000 deaths and the settlement of an additional 100,000 in refugee camps (Grim and Finke 2011). Communal conflict has not only pitted Hindus against Muslims; 700 homes owned by Christians were destroyed by Hindu extremists in 2007 in a series of attacks in the state of Orissa (U.S. Department of State 2008e).

Episodes of violent conflict in India continue for many reasons. Influential social movement organizations acting on behalf of religious identity groups in Indian society continue to heighten grievances against other religious groups, both among dominant and minority groups. These grievances are regularly expressed through outbursts of communal violence, and these have been seen so frequently in India that Nandy and his colleagues (1995) have remarked that communal violence has become a normalized form of mass political expression. The lack of a wholly impartial law enforcement apparatus and an inefficient, ineffective judiciary also contribute to the sustenance of communal violence in India, not only by interfering with the enforcement of the state’s legal promises of religious freedom, but also by obstructing two legitimate institutional channels that the aggrieved could rely on in conflict resolution. During the 2002 violence in BJP-controlled Gujarat state, police were reportedly told by their superiors to let Hindus “vent their anger” and allow them to conduct reprisals against Muslims in the wake of a lethal railway attack (Ramachandran 2011). Police repeatedly arrest the victims and not the instigators of communal violence, and have been accused of filing false charges against victims, failing to file complaints against alleged perpetrators of communal violence, and processing complaints differently based on the religion of the accused (U.S. Department of State 2008e; van der Veer 2005). The judiciary is of little more use in defusing or resolving conflict. It is generally independent of the executive but is plagued by corruption and tremendous case backlogs. As of 2009, there were 38 million civil and criminal cases that had been left pending (Freedom House 2009). An outbreak of violence against Sikhs in 1984 led to 2,733 admissions of homicides, yet only nine of the alleged murderers were convicted in court (Ramachandran 2001).

There appears to be a geographic link between violations of religious liberties and the prevalence of violent conflict in India. States accused of violations of citizens’ religious freedoms are also generally the sites of the most violent episodes of social conflict. These states are usually governed by political parties that tend to sympathize with the Hindutva movement. For example, Orissa was governed by a coalition that included the BJP during the 2007 communal violence there. Orissa also is the site of one of the nation’s most stringent anti-conversion laws, the Orissa Freedom of Religion Act of 1967, which enables imprisonment for those found of attempting to convert others to religion by “inducement” (U.S. Department of State 2008e). The chief minister of Gujarat during the 2002 riots had his United States visa revoked on grounds of committing severe religious freedom violations stemming from his management of the conflict (BBC News 2005). Violent conflict in India is inextricably linked not only with grievances between religious identity groups, but also with geographically specific violations of religious freedom.

India is a society that has been the site of recurrent violent conflict contested largely on religious lines. Although religion has been interwoven with other markers of identity, such as economic position, social status and regional identity, religious identity remains a potent signifier of differences between identity groups in India. The case of India illustrates how even when the federal government is not formally restricting religious freedoms or enacting violence, powerful social pressures and social movements can both deny freedoms and promote violence. To the extent that local
governments support such actions and judiciaries are ineffective in preventing the denial of freedoms, the likelihood of violence increases.

**GUYANA**

A country along the northern coast of South America, Guyana is home to a blend of ethnic and religious diversity that is arguably unmatched in all of Latin America. The country has experienced intermittent episodes of conflict and upheaval during its history, often precipitated by political disagreements—especially around the time of elections—and economic grievances (Mars 2001). Guyana should not be looked at as a model of a conflict-free society. Yet despite its religious diversity and the presence of large religious identity groups, the conflicts that have visited Guyana throughout its history have not had significant religious overtones.

Indeed, unlike the other countries described in this Report, Guyana’s conflicts were and are not based on religious differences or religious grievances, nor has there been a concerted effort to heighten conflicts by playing on religious differences. This is all the more remarkable considering that the opponents in Guyana’s recent conflicts are largely of different religious faiths: Christians on one side and Hindus on the other. Religion is not restricted strongly at either the state or societal level in Guyana, and we argue that this likely contributes to the absence of conflicts in Guyanese history defined along religious lines. Social conflict has plagued the country’s past and present, but Guyana further illustrates that it is not religious diversity per se that fosters conflict, but rather how diverse populations choose to interact. When religious freedoms are secure and no single religion holds an advantage over another, religious diversity can often serve to defuse conflict rather than ignite it.

**Religious, Demographic and Governmental Background**

Guyana has a population of about 750 thousand people according to U.S. Census Bureau estimates (2011). According to the 2002 census, about 44 percent of the population is Indo-Guyanese, or of East Indian descent, while about 30 percent are Afro-Guyanese and trace their ancestry to Africa (Central Intelligence Agency 2011). There are also sizeable communities of people of Chinese and Portuguese ancestry, as well as sizable indigenous mixed-ethnicity populations (Younger 2010). Christians make up the largest share of the population, but they are divided across a number of groups and denominations. Pentecostals were the largest of the Christian groups as of 2002, making up 17 percent of the population, while Catholics, Anglicans and Seventh-day Adventists each made up at least five percent and other Christian groups comprise another 20 percent. There are also large Hindu and Muslim populations in Guyana; about 28 percent of the population identifies as Hindu, and seven percent identify as Muslim, most of whom are Sunni Muslims. Rastafarians, members of the Baha’i faith and other groups are also present. Religious affiliation does not map cleanly onto ethnic identity, though the country’s Hindus (who are largely Indo-Guyanese) and Rastafarians (who are largely Afro-Guyanese) are exceptions to this (U.S. Department of State 2010d).

Unlike the other countries reviewed in this report, most of Guyana’s current population can trace its ancestry to international migrants who arrived within the past four
centuries. The Dutch West India Company began importing slaves from Africa to work the plantations in the mid-1600s when the territory and its surroundings were under Dutch control. Great Britain was awarded the territory that makes up present-day Guyana and established the colony of British Guiana in the 19th century. Indentured workers, most of them Indian, arrived in the mid-1800s after the abolition of slavery in the British Empire. A majority of Indian workers remained in British Guiana after their original indentures lapsed, and their ancestors make up the country’s present-day Indo-Guyanese population (Premdas 1995). Sharp social divisions emerged between the Tamil speakers from southern India and the Hindi speakers from northern India persisted long after Creole became the country’s dominant language, and of the Indo-Guyanese who remain in the country, those of south Indian and north Indian heritage retain distinct cultures to this day (Younger 2010).

Following independence 1966, Guyana remained in a state of ethnopoli\-tical conflict for decades, as the Afro-Guyanese in power and the largely Indo-Guyanese opposition engaged in decades of violent strikes against one another (Premdas 1995). In 1992, faced with international pressure to reform and a viable multiethnic opposition movement, the Afro-Guyanese People's National Congress acquiesced to calls for free and fair elections, which brought their longtime opponents, the People's Progressive Party, to power. Tensions between the two ethnically polarized political parties have remained, and while the major ethnic groups in Guyanese society are not in a perpetual state of violent conflict, episodes of violence have consistently marred elections in Guyana (Hinds 2009). Freedom House (2009) cited the rise of a multiethnic third party, the Alliance for Change (AFC), in the 2006 elections as a hopeful sign that the racial polarization of Guyana’s acrimonious politics may be on the decline.

Guyana is now an electoral democracy, and citizens vote to elect members of the 65-seat National Assembly. The leader of the party that receives the greatest number of seats becomes the country’s president, and the president appoints a prime minister. Elections in Guyana tend to be accompanied by a great deal of civil unrest, but the 2006 elections transpired as planned with considerable international monitoring. The country’s judicial system is generally independent, though ill-resourced.

**Government Restriction and Favoritism of Religion**

According to the U.S. Department of State’s International Religious Freedom report for 2008, the Guyanan state does very little to regulate religion, and it also shows little favoritism toward any given religious groups. This is reflected in the ARDA researchers assigning Guyana scores of zero on both the indexes of government restrictions and governmental favoritism of religion. While religious groups are required to register with the government to be formally recognized, the state does not discriminate in which groups it recognizes. The freedom of worship is respected both in law and in practice, and no restrictions or limitations on this freedom were recorded by the State Department. There were no reports of discrimination based on religious grounds and individuals had the right to choose or change their religion as they saw fit (U.S. Department of State 2008d). Since the 2008 coding wave, there have been reports that in 2009 that forty foreign Mormon missionaries had been detained and were instructed to leave the country, but this appears to have been an isolated incident (U.S. Department of State 2010d). In addition, the Guyana Defense Force appears to favor Christian religious practice, as in general, only Christian ministers gave sermons on the Defense Force’s bases. However, Christian religious affiliation does not appear to assist officers in ascending the ranks, nor does affiliation with another religious tradition hamper their careers (U.S. Department of State 2010d).

**Social Restriction of Religion**
Based on the ARDA’s coding of the Department of State’s 2008 International Religious Freedom report there is little societal restriction of religious practice in Guyana. In fact, the country received a score of zero out of 10 on the Social Restrictions Index. In addition, there was no religion related violence reported and there were no social movements reported that sought to reduce the freedoms of religious groups. Guyana’s scores of zero on religious restrictions, religious favoritism, and social restrictions measures are the lowest scores possible and signify that religious freedoms and equal treatment across religions are high. We should note, however, that while this does not mean that religious freedoms are never denied or all religions are always treated equally, levels of restriction and favoritism of religion were so low in 2008 that they were not mentioned in the 2008 report.

**Social Conflict in Guyana**

Even though it is a country with deep ethnic fault lines, and despite the substantial overlap between religious affiliation and ethnicity in the country, Guyana’s expansive religious diversity has done little to intensify the ethnic and political conflicts that have plagued the country. The most intense social conflict in Guyana has been tied to the long historical struggle for political power between the Afro-Guyanese and Indo-Guyanese populations. The Afro-Guyanese have asserted their dominance in independent Guyana on the grounds of their longer tenure in the country (Horowitz 1985), while the Indo-Guyanese have argued for more power based on their larger population base (Hinds 2009). Even though the Afro-Guyanese represent the largest numbers in the Christian groups and Indo-Guyanese constitute the vast majority of the Hindus, religious identity has not been used as a weapon in fighting the country’s political battles. Indeed, some Afro-Guyanese participate in religious rituals of the south Indian Hindu tradition (Younger 2010) and conversion across major religious divisions is not uncommon. Religion has not developed as a source of grievances in these battles, and religious differences have not amplified the differences between the groups.

Religion's general irrelevance to Guyana’s political and social conflicts can be attributed in part to the absence of restrictions imposed on religious groups by the state and by society. The low level of historical restrictions on religion by the state and larger society inhibited the formation of ethnic movements organized around religion and mitigated potential religious grievances on both sides of the conflict. Religious freedoms have helped to defuse potential conflicts in this area by granting equal privileges and freedoms to all religious groups. A multiplicity of religious affiliations in the country and the lack of a dominant “ethno-religion” have both contributed to the relative absence of conflict between religious identity groups. Despite the ongoing ethnic conflicts, religion is not used as an institutional form or movement for mobilizing or justifying social conflicts. The Guyana case helps to show that not only do religious freedoms serve to preserve existing peaceful relations in an established and peaceful democracy; they can serve to prevent an escalation of religion related violence in a country experiencing conflict.

**Conclusion**

Over two centuries ago Adam Smith concluded that “[the] active zeal of religious teachers can be dangerous and troublesome only where there is, either but one sect tolerated in the society, or where the whole of a large society is divided into two or three great sects (Smith 1976:314).” He went on to explain that “if the government was perfectly decided both to let them all alone, and to oblige them all to let alone one another, there is little danger” (Smith 1976:315). Adam Smith is not alone in this reasoning. Other 18th century scholars (e.g., Voltaire and David Hume) and a growing list of
contemporary scholars offer similar assessments. Both the case studies and the global overview illustrate how religious freedoms serve to defuse potential violence and how the lack of freedom is associated with increased violence.

When governments deny religious freedoms the most obvious consequences are the increased grievances of the religious groups being restricted. Yet, as shown in the case studies and the global overview, the consequences of these formal state actions ripple far beyond the immediate denial of a specific freedom. The absence of freedoms for one group often emboldens other groups, especially majority groups, to try to further consolidate their position in society. Social movements and less formal social and cultural pressures frequently promote restrictions that go far beyond the actions of the state. The lack of religious freedoms can also result in social, economic and residential conditions that contribute to higher levels of violence. The social restrictions and pressures denying religious freedoms are closely tied to many of most prominent violent religious conflicts in the world today.

Given below are a few of the key findings that have been reviewed in this report:

- **Religious freedoms are routinely denied.** Religious freedoms are promised in 92 percent of all national constitutions, but are routinely denied. Fifty five percent of the countries guaranteeing religious freedom in their constitutions have laws restricting these freedoms. The lowest levels of religious restrictions are found in the Western Hemisphere and Christian majority countries, but no region or world religion is exempt from placing restrictions on religious freedoms (see Figures 1-5).

- **The global profile of social conflict varies by the type of conflict.** Using three measures of social conflict we offer a familiar global profile of conflict. Yet the three distinct measures document that religion related violence soared over other types of social conflict in South and Central Asia and intrastate social conflict was higher than other forms of social conflict in Africa (see Figure 6 on page 10).

- **States’ vary in their motives and avenues for denying religious freedoms.** In many cases, states will restrict the religious freedoms of minority religions in an effort to support the dominant religion(s) allied with the state (e.g., Sudan). In other cases, religions are restricted because they are viewed as threats to the state or to the social order (e.g., Vietnam). In either case, restrictions can be imposed through blatant interference in the life of religious group (e.g., restricting worship, conversion or open expression) or through more subtle channels and laws that prevent the group from practicing their religion (e.g., registration requirements or local enforcement of vaguely defined standards of public order).

- **The social (and cultural) motives and avenues for denying religious freedoms also vary.** From informal cultural pressures to well-organized religious, social and political movements, religions often face restrictions from groups outside of the state. These movements often seek support from the state in restricting other religions, but they also takes actions independent of the state to restrict freedoms and initiate violence. India, Sudan and the Caucasus states all provided multiple examples.

- **Government restrictions are strongly associated with social conflict.** Although governments often respond to religion related violence with more restrictions, the government denial of religious freedoms is strongly associated with higher levels of social conflict. The relationship being especially strong for religion related violence (see Table 1 on page 15). Vietnam and Sudan offer some of the most prominent examples, but the relationship was evident in all of the cases reviewed, with the exception of Guyana.

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40 See Grim and Finke (2011) for a more complete discussion.
Social restrictions are strongly associated with social conflict. The relationship between social restrictions and religion-related violence is especially strong (see Table 2 on page 17). When using multivariate models that include multiple controls, societal attitudes and social movements opposing other religions remain potent predictors of social conflict. This relationship is obvious in the case studies of India and Sudan, but it is evident in many countries across the globe.

The social isolation and discrimination of religious groups (often resulting from restrictions) are strongly associated with more social conflict. To the extent that government and social restrictions on religion serve to increase the social isolation and discrimination of religious groups, these restrictions can have an indirect as well as a direct influence on social conflict. Reducing contact between religious groups and assigning them unequal social status and privileges is associated with more tension and conflict between groups (see Table 2). The Caucasus nations, India and Sudan all illustrated how isolation and inequalities across religions can contribute to violence.

When ethnicity and religion are tightly overlapped, actions against a religion can be viewed as actions against the ethno-religious group. Even when religion is not the only or even the primary driver of violence, as in the case of the Caucasus states and Sudan, restrictions against a religious minority are also restrictions against an ethnic minority, and favoritism toward only one religion openly excludes other ethnic groups. In contrast, when the religious freedoms are protected, as in the case of Guyana, religion does not ignite violence despite a close overlap with the ethnic groups in conflict.

When viewed as a whole, government restrictions on religious freedoms, social and cultural treatment of religious groups, and the various forms of social conflict are tightly interwoven and interconnected. This is especially clear with regard to violence related to religion. The threat or even the perceived threat of religious groups leads to a social outcry for more religious restrictions and the increased restrictions raise the potential for social conflict. Restrictions on religious freedoms and episodes of violent conflict recur and reinforce one another in a cyclical pattern of escalation.
Bibliography


Allport, Gordon. 1954. The Nature of Prejudice. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Versions of contact theory were evident in the 1940s, but Allport’s provided the most detailed, convincing, and enduring introduction. Although many variants of contact theory now exist, and the theory is applied at both the micro and macro levels, the core arguments are outlined in this classic text.

Altstadt, Audrey L. 1996. “Ethnic Conflict in Nagorno-Karabagh.” Pp. 227-254 in Ethnic Conflict in the Post-Soviet World: Case Studies and Analysis, eds. Leokadia Drobizheva, Rose Gottemoeller, Catherine McArdle Kelleher and Lee Walker. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. Altstadt provides a short summary of the historical roots of the conflict in this region of Azerbaijan as well as an in-depth description of the major events that transpired during the “hot” phase of the conflict in the late 1990s. She describes the degrees of influence that various state actors, specifically Russia, Iran, Turkey and the United States, had in the region as of 1996 and how these actors could have played a role in mediating the conflict.


Barker, Eileen. 1984. The Making of a Moonie: Brainwashing or Choice. Oxford, United Kingdom: Basil Blackwell. Relying on interviews, questionnaires and participant observation Barker did an in depth study of the recruitment techniques used by the "Moonies." She found that the vast majority of those introduced to the faith through workshops chose not to join and those who joined did so willingly and without coercion, deception or "brainwashing."


Bouquet, Mathieu. 2010. “Vietnamese Party-State and Religious Pluralism since 1986: Building the Fatherland?” Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia 25(1):90-108. Bouquet describes the effects of Community Party of Vietnam’s change in stance on religious practice in 1990 from opposition to selective accommodation. The Party, Bouquet argues, came to recognize that religious institutions could be co-opted to serve the state’s nationalistic ends. This realization is not a reconsideration of religion’s capacity to act as ideological competition with communism, but is instead a signal of a new strategy for managing and mitigating ideological competition.


Chorbajian, Levon. 1994. “Introduction to the English Language Edition.” Pp. 1-48 in The Caucasian Knot, eds. Levon Chorbajian, Patrick Donabedian and Claude Mutafian. London: Zed Books. Chorbajian and his colleagues have authored one of the most definitive works on the troubled history of the Nagorno-Karabakh region in Azerbaijan. Chorbajian’s introduction summarizes the elements of the region’s history that have most powerfully driven the present conflict there, and he seeks to dispel the argument that religion is a primary force driving the conflict.


Corley, Felix. 2010. “NAGORNO-KARABAKH: ‘We are getting ready for war and we need our nation to be united.’” Forum 18 News Service, April 27. Retrieved July 19, 2011 (http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1437). Forum 18 is self-described as "a Christian web and e-mail initiative to provide original reporting and analysis on violations of the freedom of thought, conscience and belief of all people, whatever their religious affiliation, in an objective, truthful and timely manner." Despite their status as an advocacy organization, they have a strong record of providing accurate information.

Crispin, Shawn W. 2006. “In capitalist Vietnam, it’s ‘repression as usual.’” Asia Times Online, July 6. Retrieved July 25, 2011 (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/HG06Ae03.html). Asia Times Online is a web-based news service with a primary focus on Asian current events and issues. The publication is a successor to the print-based Asia Times and averaged approximately 85,000 daily visitors in the summer of 2010.
Deng, Francis M. 1995. *War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. Deng’s definitive history of Sudan chronicles the role of ethnic identity in the Sudanese civil war. The work is an essential resource for scholars hoping to understand the deep ethnic, tribal and regional divisions in Sudanese society prior to the secession of the South.

Deng, Francis M. 2001. “Sudan – Civil War and Genocide: Disappearing Christians of the Middle East.” *Middle East Quarterly* 8:13-21. Retrieved July 15, 2011 (http://www.meforum.org/22/sudan-civil-war-and-genocide). Deng builds on his earlier work by arguing that religious differences are the key fault-line of the Sudanese civil war. Christianity has come to form a principal component of the South Sudanese identity, in large part in opposition to the desires of the North to Islamize unified Sudan. Christian worship in the South, according to Deng, has become an act of political defiance as well as an expression of faith.


Evans, Malcolm D. 1997. *Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. Covering hundreds of years of history, this book offers a detailed overview of the origins and application of religious freedoms in Europe. Extensive documentation and citations are given on treaties and court cases that have addressed the topic of religious freedoms. The primary focus is on Europe, but the research also reviews documents drafted by the League of Nations and the United Nations.


Fairbanks, Charles H, Jr. 2004. “Georgia’s Rose Revolution.” *Journal of Democracy* 15:110-124. An election observer in Georgia as well as an academic, Fairbanks chronicles the events leading up to Georgia’s fraudulent 2003 election, the mass protests in its wake that led to the resignation of the country’s long-time president, and the ascendance of the protest’s leader to the presidency in 2004. Unlike nearby Azerbaijan, where protests against an allegedly-fraudulent election in 2003 dissipated, protesters in Georgia succeeded in bringing down the country’s authoritarian regime and replacing it with one that promised more openness in government.

Finke, Roger and Robert R. Martin. 2011. "Ensuring Liberties: Understanding Religious Freedoms and Restrictions." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for the Sociology of Religion, August 19, Las Vegas, NV. Relying on the ARDA data used in this report, the authors use multi-variate analysis to test competing arguments on the sources of religious freedoms. The initial findings of this paper provide the foundation for some of the results given in this report.

isolation (physical and social), and movements organized around religion (social and political) all contributed to our final explanation of religious violence.

Fox, Jonathan. 2008. *A World Survey of Religion and the State*. New York: Cambridge University Press. This is a summary report on Fox's detailed data collection on religion and the state. Offering a detailed overview of the quantitative data and a region by region review of religion and state relations, this study gives a detailed introduction to religion and state relations around the world. Fox concludes that the states regulation of religion is ubiquitous.


Freedom House. 2009. *Freedom in the World 2009*, ed. Arch Puddington. New York: Freedom House. Freedom House’s annual *Freedom in the World* publication is a global survey of civil liberties and political rights in every country in the world and a number of disputed territories. The publication rates civil and political freedoms in every country on a seven-point scale, and it also provides detailed descriptions of how these freedoms are or are not restricted. Scores on the subcategories that are used to calculate Freedom House’s measures of the status of civil liberties and political rights are posted online at the website given below.


Froese, Paul. 2008. *The Great Secularization Experiment: What Soviet Communism Taught Us About Religion in the Modern Era*. Berkeley: University of California Press. As the title suggests, this book reviews the Soviet attempts to secularize a nation. The research reveals the historical events and "experiments" tried for eliminating religion, but the greatest contribution is helping readers understand why the attempts were never fully successful.

Gallab, Abdullahi A. 2008. *The First Islamist Republic: Development and Disintegration in the Sudan*. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company. The Islamist government that came to power in Sudan in 1989 was made possible by years of political organizing and religious scholarship, and Gallab provides an account of how these components of the Islamist movement in Sudan coalesced. He also presents a detailed examination at the Islamists’ views of the ideal state, as well as how the Islamist government under al-Turabi disintegrated and led to a monopoly of political power under al-Bashir.

over 100 pages to explaining the potential dangers of cults to the individual and society. Following
the report the government’s “Observatory on Sects/Cults” was created in 1996 and was reorganized
into the “Interministerial Mission in the Fight Against Sects/Cults” in 1998 and into the Inter-
ministerial Monitoring Mission against Sectarian Abuses (MIVILUDES) in 2002.

Press. Gill devotes the first two chapters to outlining a theory for explaining the "political origins of
religious liberty." He argues that rather than being a product of secularization, religious liberties are
the product of "interest-based calculations." The remaining chapters are devoted to case studies that
test and illustrate the theoretical arguments.

Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg and Håvard Strand.
Gleditsch et al. (2002) offer a detailed description of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset.
Multiple updates on the data collection have been published in the Journal of Peace Research since
this publication. For additional information on the dataset or to download the data, go to
http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/ or to the MacroDataGuide at

Grim, Brian and Roger Finke. 2006. “International Religion Indexes: Governmental Regulation,
Government Favoritism, and Social Regulation of Religion.” Interdisciplinary Journal of Research
on Religion 2, Article 1. (http://www.religiounal.com/). Along with reviewing how the ARDA data
were coded and collected, the article explains how the Governmental Regulation, Government
Favoritism, and Social Regulation of Religion Indexes were constructed. The article also assesses the
reliability and validity of the indexes.

Grim, Brian and Roger Finke. 2011. The Price of Freedom Denied: Religious Persecution and
Violence. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. This book argues that contrary
to the opinion of many, ensuring religious freedoms reduces violent religious persecution and
conflict. The authors develop a theoretical argument supporting this position and use data collected
by the ARDA for testing the theoretical arguments.

Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Hertzke tells the engaging story of how religious freedoms
came to the fore in the United States in the early 1990s and reviews how the International Religious
Freedom Act was eventually passed. In particular, he gives an inside view of the personalities and
processes involved.

Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Hibbard provides detailed surveys of how
religion has influenced the political lives of Egypt, India and the United States. In the Indian case
study cited in the present report, Hibbard charts the rise of secularism in Indian politics driven by
Nehru as well as the rise of Hindu nationalism. The chapters devoted to India show that while the
contest over secularism in Indian political life and institutions continues, majoritarian religious
factionalism became a dominant force in Indian politics that not even secularism’s historical
defenders could resist.

Anthropologies of Guayana: Cultural Spaces in Northeastern Amazonia, eds. Neil L. Whitehead and
Stephanie W. Aleman. Tucson, AZ: The University of Arizona Press. This edited volume presents a collection of anthropological perspectives on the life of the peoples of northeastern South America. In his chapter, Hinds explores the political history of the Guyanese people and argues that the deep ethnic conflicts that have been a feature of Guyanese politics have prevented the formation of a strong sense of Guyanese nationalism.


Human Rights Watch. 1994. *Azerbaijan: Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh*. New York: Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch is a non-governmental organization devoted to protecting human rights and advocating for change where people’s rights have been violated. The organization has published case study reports, such as the two cited in the present report, that document and describe the context of human rights abuses and also make recommendations for specific remedies.


Huntington, Samuel P. 1996. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster. In the opening page of the preface, Huntington states that “[t]his book is not intended to be a work of social science.” Yet, this work has been highly in the social sciences as well as the more general public. Even as Huntington's key propositions gained little research support, his work effectively highlighted the importance of religion and culture for understanding social conflict.

Idris, Amir H. 2005. *Conflict and Politics of Identity in Sudan*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Idris offers a history of Sudan dating back centuries in his attempts to explore the roots of the conflicts that gripped the country for decades, both in Darfur and between the North and South. Sudan is an acute example of the “crisis of citizenship” in post-colonial Africa, where peoples who came to live together in borders they did not draw must negotiate life in multiethnic, religiously diverse societies.


Kuru, Ahmet T. 2009. Secularism and State Policies Toward Religion: The United States, France and Turkey. New York: Cambridge University Press. Using detailed case studies of France, Turkey, and the United States, Kuru illustrates and tests his arguments on religion and state relations. He draws a sharp distinction between assertive secularism, which requires the state to take an assertive role in excluding religion from the public arena, and passive secularism, which obliges the state to play a more passive role and to allow religion a visible presence in the public sphere. The research relies on an extensive use of primary documents on the three countries reviewed.

Mars, Perry. 2001. “Ethnic Politics, Mediation, and Conflict Resolution: The Guyana Experience.” Journal of Peace Research 38:353-372. Mars studies ethnic and political conflict in Guyana through the lens of conflict resolution. According to Mars, Guyana is an example of a state that has historically attempted to resolve conflict through coercive means, methods which ultimately exacerbated the conflicts themselves. He suggests that more democratic or bottom-up approaches to dealing with Guyana’s political and ethnic divisions may pay dividends in resolving these long-running tensions.


Minorities at Risk Project. 2009. “Minorities at Risk Dataset.” College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. Retrieved July 6, 2011 (http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/). The Minorities at Risk Project monitors communal groups that are politically active in every world country with a population of at least one-half million people. The Project’s dataset tracks 283 such groups and contains information on their conflicts with one another, with other groups and with the state. The present report’s ISC measure of conflict was partially created using multiple measures from the Minorities at Risk Dataset.

Nandy, Ashis, Shikha Trivedy, Shail Mayaram and Achyut Yagnik. 1995. Creating a Nationality: The Ramjanmabhumi Movement and Fear of the Self. Delhi, India: Oxford University Press. Nandy and his colleagues compiled a comprehensive history of Hindu nationalism and religious violence up to 1995 using the movement to construct a temple on the site of the Babri Mosque at Ayodhya as their focal point. The authors detail the social and political trends that led to the destruction of the
mosque and the communal violence that followed it, paying particular attention to the movement to wed Indian nationalism with the Hindu faith.


Pettigrew, Thomas and Linda Tropp. 2006. “A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 90: 751-783. This article offers an excellent overview of contact theory and the variants of this argument. The authors also review the vast research literature on this topic and assess the current level of support for the key hypotheses.

The Pew Research Center. 2007. *Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream*. Retrieved July 30, 2011 (http://pewforum.org/Muslim/Muslim-Americans-Middle-Class-and-Mostly-Mainstream(2).aspx). Most attention is focused on Muslims in America, but the report also gives interesting comparisons between Muslims in America and Muslims in other countries. This report is one of several Pew Research Center reports on Muslims.


PRS Legislative Research. 2011. “Vital Stats: Communal Violence in India.” Retrieved July 8, 2011 (http://www.prsindia.org/parliamenttrack/vital-stats/communal-violence-in-india-1821/). PRS Legislative Research is an independent, non-partisan research organization in India that works with members of the Parliament of India to offer research support on a host of legal and policies issues. It is currently supported by the Ford Foundation, the Google Foundation and other charitable groups, and is housed at New Delhi’s Centre for Policy Research.


Richardson, James T., and Massimo Introvigne. 2001. “‘Brainwashing’ Theories in European Parliamentary and Administrative Reports on ‘Cults’ and ‘Sects.’” *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 40(2): 143-168. The authors conclude that the “ideas about brainwashing and mind control [are] alive and well in Europe, and that those idea have been important in the promotion of the moral panic in some European countries over cults and sects (p. 173).” Relying on documents and reports from state agencies in Germany, Italy, France, Sweden, Switzerland and Belgium, they highlight the fears and misconceptions that they hold about minority religions.


Shterin, Marat S. and James T. Richardson. 1998. “Local Laws Restricting Religion in Russia: Precursors of Russia’s New National Law.” *Journal of Church and State*, 40 (2): 319-341. The authors stress the importance of local laws, administrative units, and social pressures for denying freedoms. Although much of their attention is on local laws, they also note how local administrators can conform to local cultural pressures.

Shupe, Anson D. and David G. Bromley. 1980. *The New Vigilantes: Deprogrammers, Anti-cultists, and the New Religions*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications. This research documents the anti-cult movements that arose in the United States during the 70s and argues that the movement arose despite a lack of evidence that the cults were guilty of the many charges wagered against them. In agreement with research that followed, they argue that it was a "moral panic" that was not grounded in evidence.

Sidahmed, Abdel Salam. 1996. *Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan*. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Sidahmed’s book is a political history of Sudan, focusing specifically on the country’s political developments post-independence. He argues that Sudan’s religious politics are unusual because its history and ethnic diversity would not suggest that the country was a prime candidate to become the sort of Islamist state it was when he wrote this book in 1996.

Smith, Adam. [1776] 1976. *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. Adam Smith needs no introduction, but his comments on religion have often been overlooked. Not only did he suggest that religion could survive and even thrive in a less regulated (and less subsidized) religious economy, he thought that lifting religious restrictions would increase the peace between religions.

Smith, David and agencies. 2010. “Omar Hassan al-Bashir declared winner of Sudan election.” *The Guardian*, April 26. Retrieved July 14, 2011 ([http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/apr/26/bashir-sudan-elections-kiir-secession](http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/apr/26/bashir-sudan-elections-kiir-secession)). *The Guardian* is a British daily newspaper founded in 1821, and is one of the United Kingdom’s leading newspapers. The paper’s website was launched in 1999 and was the first newspaper website in the United Kingdom to receive traffic of more than 20 million unique users per month.

religion innovation in the form of cults and sects will always arise unless such groups are regulated out of the market. Like other researchers studying these new movements, however, they found no research support that would justify such restrictions.

Taylor, Paul M. 2005. *Freedom of Religion: UN and European Human Rights Law and Practice.* Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. As suggested by the title, this work focuses on religious freedoms as defined and practiced by the UN and the European Union. When compared to the Evans book (listed above) the focus is more narrowly on contemporary times, but covers a wider range of topics.


UCDP/PRIO. 2009. *UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, Version 4-2009.* Retrieved July 6, 2011 ([http://www.prio.no/sptrans-1423485763/Codebook_UCDP_PRIO%20Armed%20Conflict%20Dataset%20v4_2009.pdf](http://www.prio.no/sptrans-1423485763/Codebook_UCDP_PRIO%20Armed%20Conflict%20Dataset%20v4_2009.pdf)). The cited URL links to the codebook for the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. This dataset contains information on armed conflicts over the last sixty years throughout the world. One of this dataset’s measures of conflict is used as a point of reference for other measures of conflict described in the present report.


U.S. Committee for Refugees. 2001. “Sudan: Nearly 2 million dead as a result of the world’s longest running civil war.” April 2001. Retrieved July 13, 2011 ([http://web.archive.org/web/20041210024759/http://www.refugees.org/news/crisis/sudan.htm](http://web.archive.org/web/20041210024759/http://www.refugees.org/news/crisis/sudan.htm)). Known as the U.S. Committee for Refugees when the cited article was published online, the U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants was founded as a non-partisan, independent organization that advocates for immigrants and refugees across the globe and offers them a range of services, including resettlement in the United States.
In order to comply with 1998’s International Religious Freedom Act, the U.S. Department of State is required to submit an annual report to Congress on the status of religious freedom in every country in the world. The Department of State’s International Religious Freedom reports are an invaluable resource to researchers interested in religious freedom, as they offer a comprehensive accounting of religious freedom protections and violations that is standardized across countries.


van der Veer, Peter. 2005. “Writing Violence.” Pp. 250-269 in Making India Hindu: Religion, Community, and the Politics of Democracy in India, 2nd edition, ed. David Ludden. New Delhi, India: Oxford University Press. This edited volume brings together 13 scholars to provide perspective on India’s religious divisions and the Hindu nationalist project promoted by groups and actors in civil society. In his contribution to the volume, van der Veer provides a review of how scholars have written about communal violence in India and examines the role of narrative in infusing participants’ understandings and meaning-making regarding the ongoing religious tensions.

Warburg, Gabriel. 2003. Islam, Sectarianism and Politics in Sudan since the Mahdiyya. London: Hurst & Company. Warburg considers the role of the Muslim faith in the rise of Sudan as an independent nation. He provides a thorough account of the rise and fall of Islamic Mahdist government that controlled Sudan in the late 19th century and shows how Islamism suffused Sudanese politics after independence until the coming of the Islamist republic under al-Bashir and al-Turabi.

Wood, James E., Jr. 1990. “Abridging the Free Exercise Clause.” Journal of Church and State 32: 741-52. In 1990 James Wood was the editor of the Journal of Church and State. This article offers his comments shortly after the Smith v. Oregon decision. See McConnell above for a more detailed response to the decision.


Yang, Fenggang. 2006. “The Red, Black, and Gray Markets of Religion in China.” The Sociological Quarterly 47: 93-122. Building on the theoretical arguments known as the religious economy approach, Yang argues that China has three religious markets. The red market includes the religious organizations officially approved and supported by the state. The gray market includes religious organizations that are known by the state and do not have official state support, but are allowed to operate. Finally, the black market is composed of underground religious organizations that operate in secret without official or tacit approval from the state.
Younger, Paul. 2010. *New Homelands: Hindu Communities in Mauritius, Guyana, Trinidad, South Africa, Fiji, and East Africa*. New York: Oxford University Press. Younger provides studies of a number of communities in the Hindu diaspora that grew with the coming of indentured servitude in India after the British abolished formal slavery. Guyana was one destination for indentured servants from India, and in his chapter on Guyana, Younger provides a history of Indian migration and describes how the Indo-Guyanese population developed new traditions and formed an ethnic community apart from India in South America.
Appendix A: A Note on Data Sources

Although cross-national data on religious freedoms were lacking prior to 2000, a series of high quality collections have been assembled since 2000. Freedom House provided the first collection by developing a long checklist on religious freedoms that relied on criteria from "the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religious Belief, the European Convention on Human Rights, and a long list developed by Willy Fautre." Based on the ratings received each country received a score ranging from 1 to 7, with 7 indicating a complete lack of freedoms (Marshall 2000). A few years later both the Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA) at Penn State University (Grim and Finke 2006) and the Religion and State Project at Bar Ilan University (Fox 2008) completed data collections for virtually every country in the world and with far more detail. The ARDA's project included measures on social and state restrictions as well as measures on religious persecution and religiously motivated violence. The Religion and State Project offered in depth measures on the relationship between religion and state. Most recently, the Pew Forum has also provided a collection on religious freedoms (The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life 2009). These collections have varied in the research methodologies and information sources used, but their measures on basic religious freedoms have produced very similar results. Regardless of the data source used, the global profile of religious freedoms shows little change.

This report relies heavily on the data coded by the ARDA and to a lesser extent on data from the Religion and State Project. We rely on the ARDA data for several reasons. First, because we were actively involved in the data collection, we are more familiar with the measures and methodologies used and we have confidence in the final product. Second, the ARDA collections offer a variety of measures on topics of interest for this report. We want to understand religious freedoms that go beyond the formal relationship between religion and state and we want measures on social conflicts that are related to religion. Finally, all of the data collected by the ARDA are publicly available for review and download on the ARDA.com (http://www.therarda.com/Archive/CrossNational.asp). All of the coding is transparent and open to public appraisal.
Appendix B: Measures Used to Construct Indexes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government Restrictions Index</th>
<th>Index measuring restrictions placed on religion by the government. Range is from 0 to 10, with 10 representing maximum level of restrictions.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Does the U.S. Department of State’s International Religious Freedom report mention whether foreign missionaries are allowed to operate? 0=Allowed and/or no limits reported; 1=Allowed but with restrictive limits reported; 2=Prohibited</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Does the report mention that proselytizing, public preaching, or conversion is limited or restricted? 0=No; 1=Yes, but (equally) for all religions; 2=Yes, but only for some religions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Does the report indicate that the government interferes with an individual’s right to worship? 0=No or no interference; 1=Some interference; 2=Severe interference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. How is freedom of religion described in the report? 0 = Law/Constitution provides for freedom of religion and the Government generally respects this right in practice; 1=Law/Constitution provides for freedom of religion and the Government generally respects this right in practice, but some problems exist, e.g. in certain localities; 2=Limited rights and/or rights are not protected or are restricted; 3=Freedom of religion does not exist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the introductory section of the report specifically mention that the government policy contributes to the generally free practice of religion? 0=Yes; 1=Yes, but exceptions are mentioned; 2=No.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| Social Restrictions Index | Index measuring restrictions placed on religion by society at large. Range is from 0 to 10, with 10 representing maximum level of restrictions. |
1. According to the U.S. Department of State’s International Religious Freedom report, societal attitudes toward “other” or nontraditional religions are reported to be:
0=Open and tolerant; 1=(There is isolated discrimination); 2=Negative just in certain regions or just toward certain religious brands; 3=Hostile

2. Do traditional attitudes and/or edicts of the clerical establishment strongly discourage proselytizing (i.e., trying to win converts?)
0=No; 1=Only traditional attitudes do; 2=Only clerical edicts do; 3=Both do

3. Do established or existing religions try to shut out new religions in any way?
0=No; 1=Yes

4. Are citizens intolerant of nontraditional faiths, i.e., those they perceive to be new religions?
0=No; 1=Yes, but the report only cites one case; 2=Yes, and the report cites more than one case

5. How does the report characterize citizens’ receptivity to proselytizing by nontraditional faiths or faiths other than their own?
0=Citizens are receptive, no concerns are reported; 1=Citizens are receptive but concerns are cited; 2=Citizens respond negatively

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**Government Favoritism Index**

Index measuring favorable treatment or benefits given to religious groups by the state. Range is from 0 to 10, with 10 representing maximum imbalance in benefits given to religious groups so as to favor one group.

1. What is the balance of government funding (including “in-kind” donations) to the religious sector?
0=No funding; 1=There is a proportional balance to all groups; 2=There is an imbalance in funding; 3=Funding only goes to one religion or belief

2. To what extent is there a favored or established religious brand?
0=No favored brand, or all religious brands are treated the same; 1=There are cultural or historical legacies only, e.g., the former established religious brand inherits buildings or properties; 2=Some religious brands have privileges or government access unavailable to other brands; 3=One religious brand has privileges or government access unavailable to other religions; 4=One single state or official (established) religious brand or religion

3. How does the government subsidize religion (including “in-
kind” donations to organizations run by religions, e.g., hospitals or schools)?
0=There are no subsidies, or subsidies are equal to all (e.g., all are tax-exempt); 1=Subsidies are not mentioned in the U.S. Department of State’s International Religious Freedom report, but they are implied by the level of government support for a particular religion; 2=There are cultural or historical legacies only (e.g., a religious group inherits cathedrals from previous government spending); 3=Only some religions are excluded from available subsidies; 4=Only an approved set of religions receive government subsidies; 5=Only one religion is subsidized (including “in-kind” subsidies)

4. Does the government fund some things related to religion, according to the report?
0=No; 1=The report does not mention funding, but the government gives support that probably includes funding; 2=Yes, but there is equal funding for each religion; 3=Yes, but funding is not equal for all.

4a through 4f. If “yes” to the above question, what religious things does the report say are funded by the government?
(For each of the six items below, the country can receive one of three codes: 0=No; 1=Yes, but there is equal funding for each religion; 2=Yes, but funding is not equal for all)
- Education or schools
- Buildings (including upkeep and repair)
- Clergy salary and/or benefits
- Print or broadcast media
- Charity or public service work
- Religious practice or mission work

### Social Isolation Index

Index indicating both social and physical isolation due to religious brand. Range is from 0 to 10, with a score of 10 indicating maximum social and physical isolation.

1. According to the U.S. Department of State’s International Religious Freedom report, do settlement and expansion policies (e.g., internal migration policies) have anything to do with religion?
0=Nothing to do with religion beyond holy sites; 1=Some general relation to religion; 2=Highly related to religion or belief

2. According to the report, are allegations reported of discrimination in education, housing and/or employment based on religion?
0=No discrimination; 1=Some discrimination; 2=Widespread discrimination; 3=Caste-like system

<table>
<thead>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. According to the report, are allegations reported of discrimination in education, housing and/or employment based on religion?</td>
<td>0=No discrimination; 1=Some discrimination; 2=Widespread discrimination; 3=Caste-like system</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Considering the entire report, what is the estimated number of people who were displaced from home due to religion in this country?
0=None; 1=Less than 10; 2=10 to 200; 3=201 to 1,000; 4=1,001 to 10,000; 5=10,000 to 99,999; 6=100,000 to 999,999; 7=More than 1 million

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Movements</th>
<th>According to the U.S. Department of State’s International Religious Freedom report, what is the situation regarding social movements in relation to religious brands in the country?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>0</strong></td>
<td>[Either A or B]: A) All social movement(s) exist that are reported either promote religious freedom or are amicable and do not intimidate people from (other) religious brands, or B) All social movement(s) that are reported either promote religious freedom or are amicable and do not intimidate people from (other) religious brands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td>[Either A or B]: A) Social movement(s) exist that seek national or regional hegemony for a religious brand, but they are uncoordinated at either national or regional levels (i.e., there are flashes of activity), or B) Social movement(s) exist that campaign against certain religious brands, but they are uncoordinated at either national or regional levels (i.e., there are flashes of activity).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td>[Either A or B]: A) Social movement(s) exist that seek national or regional hegemony for a religious brand through unconnected, but regionally coordinated means (i.e., there is regional &amp; organized activity), or B) Social movement(s) exist that campaign against certain religious brands through unconnected, but regionally coordinated means (i.e., there is regional &amp; organized activity).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td>[Either A or B]: A) Social movement(s) exist that seek national or regional hegemony for a religious brand through nationally coordinated means (i.e., there is national &amp; organized activity), or B) Social movement(s) exist that campaign against certain religious brands through nationally coordinated means (i.e., there is national &amp; organized activity).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C: Notes on Measures of Conflict and State Fragility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UCDP/PRIO Conflict Measure</th>
<th>The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset identifies four types of conflicts. These are: (1) conflict between a state and a non-state group outside the state’s territory; (2) interstate armed conflict between two states; (3) internal armed conflict between the government and at least one internal opposition group, with aid from other states on at least one side of the conflict; and (4) internal armed conflict between the government and at least one opposition group, with no intervention from other states. We interpreted the last of these categories of conflict as “social conflict” of the sort we focus on in this report, since it occurs between actors are groups situated entirely within a single society.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISC Conflict Measure</td>
<td>The ISC is a composite measure generated from the Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) dataset and the Minorities at Risk (MAR) Project dataset. If a country was host to a social conflict according to our interpretation of either the MEPV or MAR datasets, it received a score of 1 on the ISC, while a country that was not host to a social conflict according to our interpretation of these datasets received a score of 0 on this measure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes on the MEPV dataset</td>
<td>MEPV: There are seven categories of conflicts identified in the MEPV dataset. They are: (1) civil war, (2) civil violence, (3) ethnic war, (4) ethnic violence, (5) international war, (6) international violence, and (7) international war of independence.” In the MEPV dataset, every country receives an annual score from 0 to 10 on a number of conflict measures indicating the degree to which each type of conflict affected the social and systemic functioning of that country in a given year. A score of 0 indicates that there were no conflicts of a given type in that country, while a score of 10 denotes maximum social disruption brought on by that particular type of conflict. In order to determine whether a civil or ethnic conflict had taken place in a country for a given year, we transformed the MEPV variable CIVTOT and created a dichotomous variable from the transformation. A country’s value on CIVTOT is the sum of its scores on the four measures indicating the impact of (1) civil violence, (2) civil war, (3) ethnic violence, and (4) ethnic war for a given year. We coded countries that had a non-zero CIVTOT score as experiencing civil or ethnic conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes on the MAR Project dataset</td>
<td>We determined that a social conflict had taken place in a country if any of the three following conditions were met in the MAR dataset: (1) Country received a score of 1 on the variable INTRACON (indicating the presence of intracommunal conflict), and country received a score of 2 or greater on the variable FACTSEV1. FACTSEV1 is a measure of the severity of the intracommunal conflict between the intracommunal antagonists with the highest intensity of conflict. A score of 2 indicated that there had been a series of bombings/assassinations,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and higher scores indicated higher levels of conflict intensity. A score of 1 indicated that there had been sporadic violent attacks (i.e., attacks without weapons, attacks with knives or attacks with a few small arms (e.g., one or two handguns); we did not code unrest of this sort of sporadic nature as a violent social conflict.

(2) Country received a score of 1 on the variable INTERCON (indicating the presence of intercommunal conflict), and country received a score of 5 or greater on the variable CCGROUP1SEV. CCGROUP1SEV is a measure of the severity of the intercommunal conflict between the groups with the highest intensity of conflict. A score of 5 indicated that there had been communal rioting or armed attacks (i.e., attacks with multiple firearms, automatic weapons or heavy weaponry, or attacks without weapons, with knives or a few small arms that involved more than twenty people). A score of 4 indicated that there had been demonstrations, rallies or marches against a particular group, so we did not code unrest with a score of 4 or lower as indicative of a violent social conflict.

(3) Country received a score of 4 or greater on the variable REB (indicating the presence of a rebellion against the government). A score of 4 indicated that there had been small-scale guerrilla activity in the country that year, which included each of the following characteristics: (1) there were fewer than 1,000 armed fighters, (2) there were sporadic armed attacks (less than six reported per year), and (3) attacks took place in a small part of the area occupied by the group, or in one or two other locales. A score of 3 indicated that there had been local rebellions, or armed attempts to seize power in a locale that were not the beginning of protracted guerrilla conflict; the limited nature of these sort of episodes led us not to consider these incidents are examples of violent social conflict.

Notes on Measurement of State Fragility

State fragility as measured for Table 2 is measured by the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) ratings. These ratings were constructed by assessing twenty criteria classifiable into four categories of state traits: the quality of the country’s economic management, its structural policies, its policies for social inclusion and equity, and the quality of its public sector management and institutions. We employ a method of classifying states as fragile or not that is similar to the method used by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in their annual summary reports on fragile and conflict-affected countries (for an example, see the OECD-DAC Fragile States Group’s 2007 Factsheet Ensuring Fragile States Are Not Left Behind, available at (http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/24/40090369.pdf). States we classify as fragile in 2004 are those eligible for International Development Association (IDA) aid that scored in the bottom two quintiles in the World Bank’s 2004 CPIA overall rating. Consistent with the OECD-DAC Fragile States Group’s approach, we also classified the